GOOD AND EVIL WITHIN: OPENING THE TERRA INCOGNITA OF THE FELT SIDE OF BEING

John McMurtry
Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph NIG 2W1, Canada

Keywords: art, Buddhism, desire, emotions, epistemology, externalist fallacy, God, good and evil, felt bonds of being, happiness, idealism, life-value, life-ground, love, market, measure of value, mechanism, needs, onto-axiology, perception, phenomenology, postmodernism, psychiatry/psychology, reason, ruling value syntax, scientific method, social justice, soul, terror, unconscious, will.

Contents

7.1. The Dualism of Reason and Feeling
7.2. The Choice Space of Inner Life’s Meaning
7.3. From the Beast within to the Master Desire Mechanism
7.4. The Onto-Ethical Meaning of the Soul
7.5. The Feeling of Universality: Decoding the Opposite Directions of Felt Being
7.6. Erasing the Inner Life: The Ruling Error of the Epoch
7.7. The Dissolution of Feeling Life into the Machine Model
7.8. How Industrial Organization Erases Internal Life
7.9. Philosophers Lead the Paradigm Shift to Universal Mechanism
7.10. Re-Grounding and Opening the Lost Value Field of Felt Being
7.11. The First Person Field of Feeling Life: The Value Compass of the World Within
7.12. Attacking the Field of Felt Being: The Life-Blind Mechanism of Globalization
7.13. Phenomenology’s Failures: No Life-Ground or Elective Field of Feeling Value
7.14. Philosophies of the Dark Psyche: Blind Will, the Id, Archetypes and Inner Compulsion
7.15. The Market: Desires Are the Given that Rationality Calculates to Satisfy
7.17. Ecology without Axiology: Diamond and Lovelock and the Capitalist Value System
7.18. Why Love and Compassion Require Life Support Systems
Glossary
Bibliography
Biographical Sketch

Summary

This chapter explains the long-repressed value field of the felt side of being. Peeling back epochal layers of theoretical devalorization, normative suppression and scientific elimination by frameworks of reason-emotion dualism, reduction to natural drives, and externalist mechanism, life-value onto-axiology explains how philosophies and theories across domains have divided and blocked against the innermost value realm of feeling life. Mapping its good and evil directions across sentience, appetite, emotions, moods and will, explanation reunites and reconnects “the felt bonds of being” to life values, vital needs and
life support systems.

7.1. The Dualism of Reason and Feeling

Philosophical traditions and civilized cultures have long cordonned off rationality from the emotional side of life, which has been typically conceived as inferior and animal-like in nature. In Plato's classic, *The Republic*, Socrates (470–399 BCE) opposes reason to the irrational realm of emotions and appetites at individual and social levels. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), philosophy's next most exalted thinker, reiterates the paradigm for modernity.

Indo-European cultures of civilization before and since have constructed ontological and moral dualisms similar in division. The mind divided from body and rationality from feeling dualize humanity as a ruling ultimate dichotomy of onto-ethical and everyday presupposition.

7.1.1. Levels of the Value Dualism: An Individual, Gender, Social and International Schism

Reason and emotions-appetites have been thought of as warring elements not only within the individual, but within society (the ruling rational class and the irrational majority), and among societies (rational peoples ruling over non-rational ones).

Racism since the pre-historical conquests of first peoples has been one of the expressions of this onto-ethical dualism, which also includes the subjugation of females as emotional life without rationality. Yet this underlying master pattern of ruling thought systems is not penetrated to its metaphysical source and decider.

7.1.2. Even William James and Jean-Paul Sartre Invalidate Feeling Life

Consider here the cases of William James (1842-1910) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80), two of the most experientially open philosophers of the epoch. Sartre strikingly asserts that emotions as such are a “behavior of defeat”, a substitute for problem-solving behavior, as in “feeling upset” or “put down” (*Esquisse d’une theorie des emotions*, 1939). Emotions are not only inferior, it is implied, but express the individual’s own feeling of inferiority, “upset” and “put down” in the face of reason. He does not say, but may be obliquely referring to women.

William James also conceives with everyday understanding a similar character of emotion in his *Principles of Psychology* (1890). Emotion is a disturbance of the human organism, as the primary emotions of fear and sexual attraction - “quickened heartbeats”, “shallow breathing”, “trembling lips”, “weakened limbs”, and “visceral stirrings”.

Emotion, in short, is conventionally conceived as a state of *life incapacity* of the rational being. James later speaks resonantly of “a mother sea of consciousness” as a dynamic “finite God”, almost capturing the nature of the collective life unconscious of life-value onto-axiology tracked ahead. Yet here as well the felt side of being remains mystified even
when validated.

7.1.2.1. Sartre’s and James’ precise descriptions of specific emotional states may be acutely perceptive, but the radical reduction of the emotions to quasi-pathological states misses the ultimate life-value field which the felt side of being bears and chooses to open or close. Such reductionist stereotyping is standard in received rational understanding.

Feminist theory partially recovers the felt side of being in valorizing caring relations of concrete community against rational reductions and system brutalities. Yet none of this evolving literature from feminist epistemology to eco-feminism grounds in or identifies the underlying elective value field of feeling life itself and its vast choice space of good and evil direction behind gender divisions and external relations. The felt side of being as a more primary onto-axiological field remains unrecognized.

7.1.3. From Invalidated Feeling Life to Pharmaceuticals

Overall in the modern era, a ruling model of mechanism has systematically pre-empted the feeling side of life from understanding. The research of cognitive science, for example, eliminates it in spatial functional accounts of the brain as a closed physical system - for example, Daniel Dennett’s standard externalist account in *Consciousness* (1995).

In everyday life in parallel, contemporary pharmaceutical commodities are proclaimed to “adjust chemical imbalances” to a physical equilibrium of the body’s neural and limbic mechanisms. The felt side of human being is reduced to an external function like a temperature thermostat. By thus reducing the felt side of being and its life-defining choice spaces to an objective mechanism, “where we live within” is erased. If not, it is warned against. “Do not let the emotions in”.

7.2. The Choice Space of Inner Life’s Meaning

The first step from Plato on was to subordinate emotions to the strict rule of Reason. Most philosophers since have implied that we would be better off if liberated from them as disturbances of rational equilibrium. Disembodied meaning shorn of feeling has been an implicit ideal of science and rationality since. In religious and philosophical thought, an ancient theme is hoped-for release from the bodily passions by death itself.

The underlying ideal across schools of thought, in short, has been to ground in eternal principles in which the felt side of being is purified out for a serene rational perfection. What is invariably assumed is that cognitive thought and feeling life are divided onto-epistemic realms, and that the feeling realm is inferior and to be controlled or erased. That both levels of this metaphysical syntax are onto-axiologically false and reductionist is not traditionally suspected.

7.2.1. Theory’s Invisible Prison of Sentience and Emotion

In contemporary “analytic epistemology”, excision of feeling life goes with the prevalent mechanical models. Thus a recent industry of philosophical specialty has concerned itself
with “qualia”, those properties of felt being which are recognized, but only as emotion-neutral and value-empty in nature. Analysis is then left with trivial “phenomenal” distinctions such as between “pains and itches”, with disputes arising around one central question: the location of quality in the agent’s representation or in the sense data themselves.

The technique of robotic reduction is standard. Reduce the fields of life to a relation-and-value-free model indistinguishable from the moving parts of a machine, and focus on the control exchanges. In this way, what was once the medieval demonization of the this-worldly feeling side of being becomes its erasure by the mechanical model of modernity.

7.2.2. Perception Itself as a Horizonless Elective Field

Compare the understanding of William Blake (1757-1827). He finds an outer ruling order imprisoning sensation and feeling as the “narrow chinks of the cavern”. To the “mind-forged manacles” he opposes what human felt consciousness can open to - “seeing all as it is, infinite”.

Blake’s poetic license does not solve the problem. Yet it can be decoded by life-ground analysis as posing an ultimate value choice within sentience itself. One can live open to experiencing the limitless modalities of the feeling life, or find only a sense-data input into the body mechanism; or both - the latter only in doing science. It is this inclusive comprehension of the felt side of being as an elective value field which is missing.

7.2.3. ‘Seeing’ as Opening to the Experiencing Field Normally Blocked Out

The long cycle of novels by the contemporary anthropologist of the Toltec people of Mexico, Carlos Castenada, features the shaman, Don Juan, who makes fun of the “crazy rationality” of his academic reporter. He concludes with a summative principle of “higher seeing” which is that “the whole energy of the warrior is in the act of perception”. The “warrior” is s/he who breaks past the bars of received experiencing.

We need not accept the peyote-affected consciousness of the native seer Don Juan to comprehend the deeper point made by Blake and Aldous Huxley before him, but ignored by philosophy - that the feeling realm admits of vast differences of experiential field open to value choice, and that the more coherently inclusive is the best.

7.3. From the Beast within to the Master Desire Mechanism

The dominant classical model of the feelings and sensations is that they are unruly - an anarchic energy of animal impulsions which must be reigned in and ordered by the rational soul. This generic idea, as we have seen, is variously found from Plato to Kant (1724-1804).

This view also underlies the more ancient and canonical Upanishads and Bhagavad-Gita of India which conceive the senses and emotions as wild horses of feeling which must be reined in and subdued by the immaterial eternal soul being borne through the embodied.
world. Atman replaces Reason as ultimate pilot in this classical Indian tradition, with mind or *manas* as conceptual servant. Yet in all these diverse works of received human thought, East and West, the feeling side of being is thought to mislead or usurp reason by its nature.

7.3.1. Clearing the Decks: The Mechanical and Linguistic Turns Pre-empt Feeling Life

Modern mechanical paradigms instead rule emotions out a-priori – essentially purging the felt side of being of anything but what computers can do. This method is thought to explain human consciousness itself, and so feeling life is pre-empted. In non-mechanical linguistic paradigms, only language behavior is seen, and so the felt side of being is eliminated by other route – not by mechanical-model erasure, but by language behaviorism in which even pains disappear into the linguistic expression of them. An annihilation of the value field of feeling life is structured in.

Social sciences do better than philosophy here, it may be thought. Economics is supposed to explain the real world of production to meet life needs through time, and these are internally felt as value deprivations. Yet in the reigning “neoclassical” model, only external and observable operations of money exchange by atomic entities and aggregates exist for value attention. The felt side of being, even the need to breathe, is blinkered out.

7.3.1.1. From Classical Views of the Emotions to the Hedonic Calculus of the Price Market

We need not explain the great differences among theoretical models to understand the unstated result on which they coincide - the vast elective field of the felt side of human life is erased. In the prior classical view, reason subjugates the feelings. In the dominant scientific view, input-output mechanisms exclude inner life by definition. In linguistic behaviorism, nothing but language exists. All roads lead to the disappearance of feeling life itself.

Even where political and market stimuli of unconscious desires are deployed to sell market and political commodities, happiness quantities are projected onto external purchases. In fact, the experience of even consumer pleasure does not exist in the market’s hedonic calculus. Only propensity to pay does. Neuro-science is thus enlisted into the ruling metaphysic of economics to prove what is lacking – the quality of felt being whose ultimate field of life within has been eliminated by the externalist model. But neuro-science itself follows the externalist model of replicatable observations at another level.

7.3.1.2. Erasing the Felt Side of Being as a Field of Value

The many-sided erasure of humanity’s felt side of being has in general proceeded without principled explanation. In the classical traditions East and West, appetites and emotion were thought best subjugated by Reason or Dharma. In most contemporary theory, the felt side of being is simply eliminated. In the shadows, the feeling life that has been driven into the unconscious is ubiquitously mined for power and profit – the inner power switch of mass control.
Freudian theory seems to open up the world of feeling life, but does so only to consciously manage the alleged instinctual compulsions which the feeling life has been reduced to. In this model of the felt side of being, primeval drivers are the core of feeling life and they must be made to conform to the “reality principle” of society’s survival demands (Freud); or, more covertly, used to control the masses at economic-political levels by mass-produced desire-objects (the ‘public relations’ field founded by Freud’s nephew, Edward Bernays (1895-1991)).

7.3.2. The Silent Modern Shift from Desire as Slave to Master of Reason

The dominant culture of today derives from this overall ontoethical sea-shift which has obliterated the value field of feeling life beneath discussion. Only one master desire remains as a given propulsion of the human body – the drive for more. Management of it is now conceived in an opposite way than in the classical tradition - not as what requires impartial rule by reason, but what rationality properly satisfies in a self-maximizing way. In the words of David Hume (1711-77) in Book 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature, “reason is the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”.

Rationality as self-maximizing choice was explained in the prior chapter. Now we consider the assumed motive power of this rationality - the individuals’ desire to have more without limit as the ruling motive-feeling, a given of the human mechanism. As we have seen, this is the unquestioned first premise of economic science and, derivatively, contractarian moral theory and politics. Classical reason’s imperative of control over appetite as bestial is thus silently replaced by appetite as sovereign with reason as its instrument for maximum satisfaction.

7.3.3. The Feeling World Reduced to Propelling Mechanism for More for Self

Although classical and contemporary models ascribe opposite place-holdings to reason and desire, both shut out the elective field of felt being by metaphysical reductions.

Let us reflect on the pattern across millennia. Most simply put, humanity’s feeling side is thought to be animal-like cupidity and passions (the classical paradigm), or is reduced to one supreme propulsion for ever more for self which “rational self-maximization” satisfies as best it can (the contemporary ruling paradigm). For neither does the great field of intrinsic value of the felt side of life exist, nor its internal possibilities of good and evil direction.

7.3.4. Locking in the Felt World

Ancient wisdom’s most adamantine formula for human well-being at the core of Taoism and Stoicism is opposite in meaning - to change towards wanting less not more. The ruling value is to reduce desires to increase well-being. This human wisdom has been effectively lost to understanding when it is most of all materially needed.

The very idea of rejecting non-need consumer desires to fulfill life needs cannot compute to
the ruling value syntax. Needs and desires are conflated, and the common life-ground is blinkered out. The first premise of the ruling onto-ethic is polar-opposite - to produce more commodities to serve more desires of those who pay. In theory and practice, the felt life within is thus constructed as a “desiring machine”.

The deciding inner choice space is therefore blocked out. Even as it becomes the core issue of human survival by its demands exceeding ecological carrying capacities, no deeper ground of the felt bonds of being can be found. Driven into hiding, their longing for connectedness becomes a pit of angst, despair or disgust at the mechanical isolation. Existentialism captures the moods of the lost condition, but not the ruling value mechanism determining it.

7.4. The Onto-Ethical Meaning of the Soul

Life-ground onto-axiology responds by opening the door to our feeling life as the ultimate choice space and core of who we are. For its analysis, “the soul” is not a mystery. It is a concept whose meaning is defined as the feeling core of the human individual - the felt bonds of being opening beyond self. It may open to include only “soul mates”, adopt the bioregion or nation as “my soul”, comprehend all that exists as “world soul”, be the infinite presence or “God within”, or find ultimate concern in other way.

We say a person “has soul” when there is evidence of these opening felt bonds of being – with the possibility of “selling” or “losing one’s soul” not only possible, but perhaps conventionalized. The “soul” varies widely in life compass from self invocation and loss to identification with a few other persons to the planetary ecosystem, but it is a perpetually innermost process of finding or losing its horizonless field of feeling life. Its inner choice space of the felt bonds of being are inherent in humanity – but may open to feeling resonance with no bound, or close into self-knots. The soul, as with the feeling life field it cores, is the ultimate elective depth of human being.

7.4.1. Re-Entering the Lost Inner Field of Value

The Russian painter, Vasili Kandinsky (1866-1944), has cipherically said that “all great art comes from a vibration in the soul. The emotions are what connects the soul to the body”.

Such locutions can make no sense to the categories of philosophy and social sciences, and are absurd to models of bio-mechanism. Yet Kandinsky’s view is explained by the life-ground onto-ethic whose primary axiom begins from these inner fields of phenomena.

7.4.2. Decoding Kandinsky on Art, Emotion and the Soul

Life-value explanation is concise. “Vibrations in the soul” are deep arousal of the inner fields of felt being. “Emotions” are their specific form. “Great art” is the action which occurs to creatively connect these emotions “to the body”, that is, the art’s embodiment.

The “greatness” of the art is understood in light of the life fields involved - connecting to the boundless fields of identifying inner life (the soul) through its e-motions to animate
action (the creative embodiment) - a coherently inclusive revelation which is “great art” by its reach. This is the onto-ethical vocation of all art.

7.4.3. Understanding the Passionate and Infinite Inwardness of Kierkegaard

The Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55) affirms the soul as an infinite within, but confines its meaning to the individual’s awed and trembling relationship to the transcendent power of God.

Philosophers as radically different as Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Marcuse (1898-1979) have exalted Kierkegaard’s work, and not because of its religion. His repudiation of “bourgeois” institutions and disgust at the “mawkishness, torpor and sloth of the establishment” is acute. Yet Kierkegaard’s total projection of the infinite life-field within to an unknowable and supernatural God decouples the field of felt being from any life ground.

It is true that for Kierkegaard, this God above relates back to the world through his only Son whose self-sacrificing love is “the eternal truth in time”. Yet this task is poignantly impossible for “finite humans” to realize, and so human life is lost in its embodiment.

7.4.3.1. Leap of Faith versus Life-Grounded Choice

While Kierkegaard grounds decision in a “leap of faith” to an absolutely transcendent God, life-ground onto-ethics does the opposite - adopting life requirements and the capacities they enable as the foundational concern, with or without a supernatural Creator.

In direct opposition, Kierkegaard’s philosophy - even more than the idealist metaphysics he objects to - disconnects from direct living. The whole of the human condition is a “miserable finitude of man” with no life-value ground. Kierkegaard’s defining example of the leap of faith he counsels is Abraham’s choosing to sacrifice the life of his son Isaac to God.

Although the story of human life sacrifice to God’s revealed will comes from a tribal culture in which patriarchal authority includes the right of life and death over all other members of the family, children as well as wives and slaves, and duty to slay all other tribes in “the promised land”, contemporary philosophy indicates no critical concern. Kierkegaard’s philosophy is, instead, highly regarded in philosophical circles for its challenge of rational, universal norms on behalf of individual choice - a founding father of what is later called “existentialism”.

7.4.3.2. Losing the Thread within the Terra Incognita of the Felt Bonds of Being

Philosophers screen out the right to child homicide – children have little place in any philosophy - and preserve the awful anxiety of individual choice. Kierkegaard opens up the vast geography of the felt side of life in its awesome choice space, but is lost in its undertow towards murder in service to an examined god within. The all-too-common displacement of life-value concern by worship of a tribal god goes unnoticed.
The deepest waters here are that the very philosophy most known for exploring humanity’s inner-life infinitude goes against reason for life sacrifice to an almighty power, and his work is made a standard bearer of existentialist freedom. The individual’s inner life and elective felt bonds of being are finally reclaimed in philosophy - only to alienate them to a sanctified father right to kill demanded by the inner voice of a tribal God.

7.5. The Feeling of Universality: Decoding the Opposite Directions of Felt Being

Reflection teaches though philosophy that the connective force of feeling to the world can adopt opposite directions of “feeling universal” - a desire to expand self or group with no limit but death, or a feeling one with no limit of felt bonds of being beyond the material self.

Which direction “feeling universal” goes is inner life’s ultimate choice path. Within ruling value systems, subjugation of the other is glorified the further it extends across past borders - whether as conqueror by force of arms or money rule or both. Such dominion is affirmed to the extent of the world kept subordinate to it - an inner logic of value which may become the inverted soul of the ruling self or self-group. Life-value onto-ethics, in direct opposition, recognizes system disorder so far as life and life means are destroyed by subjugation of other lives and societies. Such judgment is implied in critical literatures (as in Tolstoy’s War and Peace and Marx’s Capital). Yet the principle of evil is not defined, least of all at the feeling level.

7.5.1. Felt Side of Being for Social Justice

Social injustice was defined in Natural Good and Evil: Beyond the Fitness to Survive as “systematic human suffering from reduced life capacities entailed by deprivation of life means”. Social justice is thus the process of overcoming this condition, the more it enables understanding and provision of the life means deprived, the more it succeeds. Motivation for it is soul driven.

The passion for social justice therefore follows a “feeling universal” that is the opposite of more power /demand for the self or self-group. Yet a dominant posture of strict “value neutrality” has been assiduously cultivated against any such recognition. In line with the ruling model of externalist mechanism, there is no onto-ethical room for it. As Charles Taylor writes in The Malaise of Modernity (1991), however, this neutrality affects the comportment of a “disembodied ghost of disengaged reason inhabiting an objectified machine” (p. 106).

Yet even with a virtue ethics like Taylor’s, no principle of social justice or injustice is defined to anchor moral feeling: so the value stand he commends continues to lack life-grounded bearings.

7.5.2. Feeling Universal and the Opposing Directions of Feeling Life: A Unifying Frame

As explained above, life can go in opposite directions with “feeling universal” - towards
ever more power to magnify self and subordinate others, or towards ever more inclusive identification with others’ life requirements as range of value concern.

The choice space for these opposite directions is mapped by a unifying onto-ethical framework which underlies advanced religious philosophies as their secular core and is applicable to all conditions:
(i) The feeling of life is ultimately an opening or closing of the felt bonds of being.
(ii) Reason’s role is inseparable from feeling finding life-coherent form.
(iii) This form is at best inclusive in the felt bonds of being.
(iv) It is worst bound to self or self-group passions in indifference to others’ suffering.

7.5.3. The Values and Disvalues of Religion and Atheism

Many relate social justice to religion and God, but again in opposite ways. Religions typically posit a transcending eternal deity as the ultimate ground of human life and value. But the direction of this God’s commands can be in good or evil direction. How to judge Gods themselves is the ultimate question not posed.

Believers trust to faith not reason; while non-believers reject God, period. This is the meta-distinction between them. Life-value onto-axiology rejects the dichotomy. God and religion are neither good, nor bad. They are one or other just so far as they are inclusionary or exclusionary in the bonds of felt life they cultivate. Here again life-value standard is the measure of validity. Religion is good or evil to the extent that it enables or disables life and life conditions by its devotion and practice.

7.5.4. The Values of Morality and Art

The feeling life aroused by art may be evaluated by the same ultimate principle of evaluation. The nature of art is to stir new felt life in others by its creation; and the deeper and wider the fields of life it ignites the better the art is. If it does neither, it fails; while to the extent that it does both, it aesthetically succeeds. As the felt side of being forms into a creative vision experienced by others, the life value of the art multiplies across the persons moved by it.

Observe the modal “can be experienced by others”. Art can be great that is not recognized, but cannot multiply its life value so long as it is not.

7.5.5. Evaluating Emotions

So far as any emotion extends felt being and thought wider and deeper for the agent and recipients, it creates life-value. Any disequilibrium it involves is good to this extent, but bad if it reduces or numbs feeling by its grossness and repetition – as with pornography and media ads. Collective felt being itself can be good, as in care for those in need. Or it can be evil, as in war fever. While all this may be intuitively recognized, it cannot be impartially identified without a principled ground of onto-axiological recognition.

In fact, group-divided passions enacted in arenas of furious organized attacks on other life
have been immensely popular across the ages including or own – “festive human cruelty” as Nietzsche approved them. But they are recognized immediately as pathological by life-value onto-ethics - with each’s bad in proportion to reductive distortion and destruction of life and life fields, however self-exalting the emotions.

7.5.6. Rage and Anger: A Paradigm Case for Evaluative Measure

Mass passions do not receive attention as pathological because the psychological sciences are standardly confined to individual subjects. Personal anger on the other hand is usually stereotyped as wrong. Yet the life-destructive “warp-frenzy” of group wars (as in the Irish epic, the Tain) is oppositely glorified. There is profound moral confusion.

The grounding moral distinction is whether the anger is life enabling or disabling. Rage can be good – for example, against social injustice - and life-ground ethics explains exactly why, or why not.

7.5.6.1. Terrorism

Even what is called “terrorism” may be good by life-value measure - for example, violent resistance to invading armies, even if such resistance is called “terrorist” by the occupiers. Albert Camus (1913-60) argued that lethal violence could only be justified if the agent of it was willing to forfeit his own life. This is highly improbable, it may seem. Yet suicide bombers of a resistance movement fulfill Camus’ condition.

When such enactment of moral rage by the militarily helpless is proclaimed evil by the powers-that-be, even when civilian deaths by the occupiers exceed 100 to 1, we confront the impasse of one-sided oppression purporting to occupy a moral high-ground.

7.5.7. The Principled Grounds of Life-Value Judgment of All Inner Life

The primary axiom of value provides the missing moral constant across conflict. In any case of moral anger, we tell whether it is good or bad by its opening or closing of life's range of being. By this measure, the art of Goya, Picasso’s Guernica, and Orwell’s writing are all good. All express rage against injustice by opening our hearts and eyes to what may have been unfelt or unseen. Similarly with what may be called “terror” by oppressors.

The same value yardstick also applies to another emotion which is also generally disapproved - jealousy. It is assumed as “an a-priori bad” by Franz Brentano, whose work is analyzed in Moral Philosophy in Question. Yet jealousy is typically based on a more primary generic feeling, love for another aroused by someone else’s relationship to the loved one. It may express itself as jealousy because of ingrained conventional expectations. Or it may be life-grounded and expressed as more consciously encompassing love – an issue discussed in McMurtry’s “Sex, Love and Friendship” (2000).

7.5.7.1. Emotions Can Open or Close

Felt being is ultimately an elective process, however powerful it is. Jealousy is like
resentment and other non-growth emotions. It is life narrowing, but can open to wider bearings. No human emotion is a fixed state, but a process admitting of value direction. Yet the opposite is presupposed by reification of a conventional categorization - emotional stereotyping and mechanism labels, for example, which may merely disapprove strong emotions as such.

Life-ground onto-ethics recognizes what inert categories of instincts, emotions, moods, and passions do not - that the felt side of being is dynamic and may always move towards better or worse. Inner human life is always elective, but the wider life field of value is standardly lost.

7.5.8. Choosing Feeling Life from Within: Blake, Epictetus and Rumi

Even sensations can be transformed in their felt nature and value - “seeing heaven in a wild flower”, as Blake famously puts it, and “the world in a grain of sand”.

Physical pain itself - discussed in The Transcultural Idea: Good as Happiness and Bad as Pain - can be transformed to awareness of the objective healing or ‘making whole again’ of which it is the felt side. The Stoic Roman philosopher, Epictetus (55-135) held that any experience, including being beaten in slavery, as he himself was, can be transfigured to serenity “in relation the cosmic whole”. “We cannot choose our external circumstances,” he says, “but we can always choose how we understand them”. Epictetus like Diogenes before him (404-323 BCE) implies an underlying sequence of equations: Reality = Experience = Internal Choice = Freedom.

The Sufi poet-philosopher Rumi (1207-1273) dazzlingly expresses this principle in regard to moods. His short poem, The Guest House, is worth citing in full as prose. It explains both the elective nature of felt being and its horizonless possibilities:

“This being human is a guest house. Every morning a new arrival. A joy, a depression, a meanness, some momentary awareness comes as an unexpected visitor. Welcome and entertain them all! Even if they're a crowd of sorrows, who violently sweep your house empty of its furniture, still, treat each guest honorably. He may be clearing you out for some new delight. The dark thought, the shame, the malice, meet them at the door laughing, and invite them in. Be grateful for whoever comes, because each has been sent as a guide from beyond.”

These thinkers all open to what is not recognized in generic principle: that the chosen nature of felt being admits of polar-opposite possibilities of good and evil direction. Human feeling is not a physical type which can be assigned a taxonomical place, but a process of internal agency. It may relate ever wider, or be paralyzed within a stereotype. There is no predetermination. The field of feeling life may be conceived as the lost core of human freedom.

7.5.9. Re-Setting the Frame of Understanding Felt Being

Yet life within as well as without still remains subject to human needs - that without which
life capacity is reduced however much its feeling side may be transformed (as explained in Section 7.10.2.). Both the elective field of felt being and its organic need requirements are erased by stock frameworks of the senses, emotions, moods and will – leaving only paralyzed categories delinked from the life-ground.

Psychoanalytic thinkers like Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Karl Jung (1875-1961) have properly warned that the feeling life driven into the subconscious may rise up in deformed passions, but as we see ahead in Section 7.14. Yet the field of feeling being has been radically reduced by Freud and Jung too. As with others in the psychological sciences, the most dangerous mass emotions of megalomania and ethnic hatreds are not addressed by ego-based frameworks; the felt demands of universal life needs are overlooked; and the elective nature of feeling life itself is not recognized.

7.6. Erasing the Inner Life: The Ruling Error of the Epoch

In our epoch, the inner life has been widely collapsed into monistic mechanism. Hans Jonas in his The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology (1966) puts the matter in clear general terms. He says that with the triumph of externalist science, “exterior reality has detached itself entirely from the interior reality” to constitute “a self-contained field for the universal application of mathematical and mechanical analysis - - [It thus] alienates man from himself and denies genuineness to the self-experience of life” (pp. 35-7).

This scientific world is causally closed, and so preempts internal life agency altogether. Much philosophy of mind and knowledge follows this model with only externalist mechanisms left – genetic machines, linguistic behaviors, and brain computers being the dominant monistic frameworks of explanation. Inner life is thus eliminated from understanding humanity.

7.6.1. The Externalist Fallacy

A monolithic but unmarked logical error is at work here. The confusion may be defined as follows: What is observable as external phenomena rules out as valid what is internally experienced.

The error of this ruling metaphysic proceeds in three steps: (1) what is not externally observable and (2) not measurable by a physical metric, is therefore (3) invalid or superfluous.

7.6.2. The Metaphysics of Invalidation

Everyday understanding follows the eliminative reduction – for example, by regarding what is not quantifiable in money terms as valueless. Many of the fetishes of our era find their metaphysical source in the externalist fallacy.

More exactly, if any region of life cannot be observed, nor measured externally by physical-referent quantifiers nor made equivalent to exchange-value, it is conventionally concluded to be illusory or of no worth.
7.6.2.1. The Lost Primary Reality: Feeling Life versus Observing It

Anyone can directly experience the felt side of being as the most undeniable reality there is – including its ups and downs, opening exhilarations and closing disconnects. The felt side of life is indeed all one can be directly certain of. It is also what makes life worth living - being feeling life as opposed to a zombie or computer.

That no-one else can observe it does not make it illusory. The distinction could not be more fundamental. Yet it has been blinkered out by externalist convention - the dominant meta-assumption that only externally observable things exist. Here only what one speaks, behaves or presents evidence to others is real, and only what is externally repeatable is valid.

7.6.3. Erasing What We Are and Live Without Knowing It

The immense external success of science at control and prediction of external entities explains the hold of its externalist method - so successful that virtually every convenience of life we now enjoy has been constructed by it.

The problem is that the ultimate life space of humanity is abolished by its metaphysic - what Jonas refers to as “the greatest usurpation in the history of human thought”, the erasure of inward experience itself. What Jonas does not recognize, however, is that even phenomenology itself has lost feeling life as a field of intrinsic value and elective direction – as explained ahead.

7.7. The Dissolution of Feeling Life into the Machine Model

Scientific method is externalist in principle because it prescribes that only observable and reproducible sequences are valid. Otherwise claims are “merely subjective” or “not replicatable”. While this metaphysic is essential in knowing redundant facts, it is blind to what makes life of intrinsic value.

Simply put, feeling life is what the robot or the computer cannot do. It cannot, for example, feel joy at being turned on and dread at being turned off; nor can it bond with other life, or turn bad moods to good. Yet these ultimate ontological and value distinctions are blocked out by externalist science and philosophy at every turn.

Consider here the ornithologist who says with approval on an international nature program: “I feel the birds I am studying sing and fly in the way they do out of joy at being alive, but I could never say this because science can’t prove it”. Observe that the inner life of both man and bird is erased a-priori. The scientist’s and the bird’s feeling life are made unspeakable. What the scientist acknowledges as his primary experience of life-value is what he cannot say.

7.7.1. The Making of Robot Consciousness

The founder of scientific method, Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) first proposed the

©Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS)
machine model as necessary to understand all reality when he prescribed in his Preface to the *Novum Organum* the sole “true principles” of inquiry (emphases added):

There remains but one course for the recovery of a sound and healthy condition - namely that the entire work of the understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step: and the business be done as if by machinery (p.2).

This is the logic of “universal mechanics”, as Sir Isaac Newton called it in his renowned *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687) some 51 years after Bacon’s death. It became the set-point of terrestrial knowledge thereafter. The model of the machine has been the central paradigm of human understanding since.

Consider, for example, the ruling neoclassical model of economics, “the moral science”. It follows the equations of nineteenth-century mechanics without a life coordinate. The second law of thermodynamics itself does not apply to the perpetual motion mechanism, as Georgescu-Roegen long ago showed, with no effect on doctrine, in *The Entropy Law and the Economics Process* (1971).

### 7.7.2. The “Privileged Access” Standpoint Does Not Resolve the Error

It is not only a question here of “privileged access”, as analytic philosophers often classify the inner world of life independent of behavioral expression. This conception too overlooks the more general distinction between being life and observing it from without to relocate the issue as one of private domain - “privileged access”. The “problem of other minds” thus arises as a standard issue in twentieth-century philosophy - that we cannot know other minds exist, the externalist fallacy in another form.

### 7.7.3. The Error Compounded: Consciousness is a Computer

Decades down the line, cognitive science and philosophy of the mind became stuck on whether consciousness can be distinguished from a computational machine, and the debate still rages.

Yet none recognize that there can only be a debate because the most basic reality of our lives, the felt side of being alive, has been screened out. Linguistic behaviorism and science have ruled it out from their models. In the pharmaceutical-psychiatric world, chemical balances and imbalances of the brain displace inner life reality and conscious direction. The most basic realities of human experience are blocked out by the variations on the externalist fallacy: that no computer however advanced can feel depressed or elated; that feeling life is typically not linguistically expressed; and that limbic chemical balances or imbalances are externally observable quantities that cannot explain why feeling universal can go saintly or demonic.

### 7.7.4. The Happiness of Market Doctrine: The Externalist Fallacy Universalized

“Happiness” has long been the ideal state of humanity – its paradox being that that one
does not achieve it by seeking it. Yet neoclassical economic theory assumes it has solved
the problem of happiness by market self-maximization and exchange. As we have seen,
however, only exchanges for priced commodities are counted in this value calculus.
Moreover, the standard equation of GDP growth = society’s gain in happiness has been
shown to be false by empirical research (as in Robert Lane’s *The Loss of Happiness in
Market Societies* (2000)). Nonetheless public policy across borders has long been made on
this incoherent premise.

7.7.5. The Onto-Axiological Set-Point behind Ecological Collapse

With more/less external monetary exchanges for commodities counting as more/less
internal human happiness, an absurd measure leads the world to ever more money-
exchange growth as the ultimate formula of human well-being. Since ecological life
systems are a-priori ignored by this growth, they are cumulatively despoiled by its ever-
rising material, energy and sink demands beneath recognition.

Here we may observe the ruling value syntax determine the supreme motive of world
humanity as ecocidal, the unseen onto-axiological set-point of increasing external disaster.

7.7.6. Felt Bonds of Life in the Market: Selling to Partisan Passions

At the same time, what sells fastest to people’s feeling lives are instant distractions
disconnected from life support systems - images of sex, bizarre extremes, and powers to
destroy. Shared forms and grounds for feeling life are pre-empted. Feelings of being alone
and alienated in the world follow - what existentialist philosophy first recognized, but
without causal explanation.

Marketing of mass passions responds to the aloneness. Group-conflict spectacles multiply
as marketing sites in which emotional ties are primevaly partisan. Within a ruling value
system of atomic individuals competing to survive, the captured felt bonds of being are
both divided against one another and disconnected from common life support systems.
Much is understood when we recognize the inner logic of these phenomena - commercial-
logo teams as the ultimate concern of the masses, politics as competing images, and
creative arts as sales contests. Felt social cohesion and wider life unity are left with no
ground.

7.8. How Industrial Organization Erases Internal Life

Prior to partisan-passion markets, erasure of feeling life occurs on the job. System
organization is structured to sequence money and commodities to greater quantities as
society’s ruling value goal, and people are deployed as detail functions to maximize these
outputs. The time-motion lockstep of the “Taylorist method”, named after Frederick Taylor
(1857-1912), rationalized the industrial assembly-line order to exclude any moment of
factory or office not harnessed to the exact sequences of this ruling order, thereby
excluding free life and choice space within it. The “scientific mechanics” of early modern
science is in this way totalized to subordinate human lives as well as other material forces
to fit as moving parts within the overall system and subsystems to achieve one end:
minimization of money costs to maximize product outputs.

Outside the workplace, military organization and leisure spectacles express the ruling value syntax in other ways. Lifetime is structured to obedience to commands in armed-force systems, or to submergence of experience in mass conflict entertainments. In either case, internal life space and wider life connections continue to be expunged. In general, the world invisibly steps to one regulating metaphysic of roboticization.

7.8.1. The Unseen Contradictions

Throughout it is confidently believed that human life and freedom are ultimately served by this reigning system. Yet the primary enjoyment of work is sacrificed, most of what is produced is unneeded, and the bulk of extracted resources is thrown away. Epidemic depressions, illnesses and addictions are not connected or related back to the ruling mechanism.

Although originally constructed for the capitalist organization of work, Taylor’s “principles of scientific management” were strongly commended by Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) and the Central Committee of the Communist Party for application to the Soviet industrial system. What choice has there been? is a question which discloses the systemic life-blindness holding across parties of establishment and revolution. Anti-technological literatures themselves fail to identify principles to re-set technology to life requirements – the steering issue addressed in Reclaiming Rationality And Scientific Method: The Life-Coherence Principle as Global System Imperative.

7.9. Philosophers Lead the Paradigm Shift to Universal Mechanism

Canonical natural philosophers like Bacon and Newton have promoted the rationality of universal mechanism from the beginning. Once this universal mechanics was projected as the method of understanding and regulating life, the greatest paradigm turn in human history advanced in a rapidly totalizing way.

Descartes (1597-1650) led early modern philosophy afterward with the basic assumption that all but life forms human beings were only machines by nature, and so could not feel pain. Thus he nailed his wife’s dog to a board to experiment on it. The felt-life agonies were screened out by the unseen ruling syntax of value – the screaming animals a metaphor of the silenced inner life.

For theory in general, the ultimate distinction between entities which feel the life they live and entities which cannot is still not clear. This is why first philosophy has been long perplexed by how to tell the difference between a human mind and a computer, or between an input-output mechanism and human sentience – with contemporary “eliminative materialism” arguing there is none. The distinction between the living and the mechanical dissolves. While Phenomenology seems to rescue human experience, they do not - as we will soon see.
7.9.1. Remembering Where We Live Against the Ruling Elimination

It is not clear where the roboticization ends. Life-value onto-axiology straightforwardly restores the lost elective life-ground within and without, but the ruling syntax of method and conception blocks against its re-entry. Yet anyone not roboticized directly knows the reality and value ranges of the feeling side of life, heart-and-head-on. Nothing could be more self-evident. The problem, however, lies in the logic of understanding whose regulating categories block out the value field of feeling life a-priori.

Yet without this feeling side of being, what value is there in living? The question is not posed.

7.9.2. Philosophy’s Amnesia of Feeling Life

A sweeping survey of philosophical schools situates understanding of what has gone missing in even philosophies of experience themselves. Feeling life prior to “privileged access” to one’s own thoughts (Analytic Philosophy) or phenomenological “sphere of ownness” (Heidegger) is not recognized. More widely in the modern canon, Kant (1724-1804) and Wittgenstein (1889-1951) lead the way in conceiving the innermost “I” as an empty logical space without a referent. “I” is an a-priori unifier of representations for Kant, a grammatical fiction for Wittgenstein. Postmodernists reclaim differences of selves without bound, but again conceive no substantive life in the logical space of the self. It is typically a function of symbolic systems, or, more brutally, of external power. Foucault (1926-84) says that to understand “one has to get rid of the subject itself”. The subject is in fact a resultant. No underlying life substance is acknowledged.

Where does the eliminative reduction of humanity’s primary substance of feeling life stop? Right here, the reader may say. “My feeling life is bedrock. Bad, good or deluded, it is always present”. This undeniable experience of inner feeling life and its poles of value directly disclose what has been lost - the felt side of being as a value field admitting of better and worse, truth or deception, denial or connection. Explaining this value field is the task of life-value onto-axiology.

7.10. Re-Grounding and Opening the Lost Value Field of Felt Being

The reality of the felt side of being is more primarily undeniable than the Cartesian cogito ergo sum, “I think therefore I am”. One feels life prior to thinking or knowing anything. Life-value onto-axiology designates this feeling space as an ultimate value field, explains its elective space as better or worse as it opens or closes, and recognizes it can lead anywhere. The hell or heaven within is well known in literatures across cultures, but not comprehended in principle.

Where can one turn to any contemporary philosophy which recognizes feeling life as a field of value choice whether expressed in language or not? Heidegger (1889-1976) the leader of contemporary phenomenology says, “language speaks us”, and the lead postmodernist Jacques Derrida (1930- 2004) repeats him. Jacques Lacan (1901-81) absorbs the feeling unconscious into linguistic chains, saying “the unconscious is structured like a language”.

©Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS)
In the postmodern emancipation from universal structures, ironically, language becomes the subject and inner human life a derivative of it.

We appear to be confronted by not just a terra incognita of the felt side of being, but a holocaust on the altar of machines and linguistics. The hollowing out of surrounding life systems simultaneously advances in the outer world, but the meta-connection has been unthinkable.

7.10.1. Recognizing the Long War on the Elective Value Field of Feeling Life

Following science, epistemologists’ reduce sentience to physical inputs into sensory receptors or efferent nerve endings. Yet human sensation is not so reducible. Science can nail down mechanical inputs and outputs, and science-bound epistemologists can follow them: but the inner field and choice space of sentient life are both thereby eliminated. One need not reject scientific utility to recognize the zombie reduction.

Poetry, painting, and dramatic acting perpetually refute this reduction by expressing the value field of feeling life in ever new modes of elective perception. Yet even here a long shadow across free feeling can be recognized. The arts themselves were long confined within ritual forms; secular dramas have been banned through centuries even in the West; and artistic passions transgressing ruling value syntax are outlawed in much of the world today.

Scientific externalism goes further by its method. The elective field of feeling life is ruled out a-priori. This may be fine for science’s mechanical reductions to control and predict redundant phenomena, but philosophers too follow the convention as a condition of knowing anything. The eminent W.V. Quine in “Naturalizing Epistemology” thus assumes as given that “the epistemologist’s goal is validation of the grounds of science”, and conceives human sentience as an input-output mechanism. Even those who disagree, like Donald Davidson, do not make it past belief sentences decoupled from felt being.

7.10.2. Needs: The Disconnected Life-Ground between Feeling and Goods

The most basic ground of feeling life is itself abstracted out. Vital life needs are the internal correlative of living or dying ranges of organic capacity. Yet they disappear from ontology, metaphysics, the social sciences and public policy itself. Not even biology textbooks identify their meaning. At the social level, they are collapsed into market demand. Needs and wants are not distinguished, but absurdly equated. This is a deep turn of capitalist modernity. In fact, market demand is only preference with money to back it, while needs are felt demands for life goods without whose fulfillment life’s capacities are always reduced – what makes them needs.

This primary distinction is unmarked in philosophy’s canon, is overridden in economics which conflates them, and is not evident in the life sciences themselves. Revealingly, the role of science as recognition of necessity fails at this level. For life-value onto-axiology, on the other hand, the distinction is moral bedrock. It provides the missing foundation of universal human life necessity and social agency to meet it defined in Sections 8.16 and
Even where needs have been investigated in normative theory, as in Doyle and Gough’s *A Theory of Human Needs* (1991), linguistic terms decide meaning, not objective life requirements. The ancient philosophical motto - “know thyself” - is thus curtailed at the line between what decisively matters to life and what does not.

### 7.10.3. Transfigurative Valuing in Perception

On the other side of necessity, the active life-value of perception is screened out. When the poet says “to see the world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a wild flower”, he reveals that even sensation may open to transfiguration *within* the moment of perception. Perception can also transmute to moral stand within it: “My anguish at the sight formed my will to stand against it”. By feeling life opening to what might be looked away from, a turning point within sentience itself occurs. No epistemology takes it into account, however, and moral philosophy overlooks its choice space within sensation itself. Life-value understanding explains what is missing - *the elective life space within for which others’ life requirements are felt bonds of being*. This is the turning point of human consciousness explained in the last chapters of this study.

### 7.10.4. Recognizing the Value Field of Feeling in Art

As with all fields of value, so with the felt side of being. Life-coherent inclusion is the measure of value, and creative art is its coherently unique expression. Art is art because it hangs together as one and stands alone. There is none before it because it is creative. It is the feeling life process building into creative materialization to enable the moving of others’ feeling life in communion. This is the nature of all art - music, dance, poetry, painting, film, and good philosophy too.

The deeper and wider the range of inner life response to a work of art, the more creatively moving it becomes. We may think here of standards like Monet’s “Water Lilies”, Puccini’s “The Humming Chorus”, Dylan Thomas’s “Fern Hill” – communal voyages of the felt side of being brought to life for others by artists’ creations. This is a criterion of their artistic effect.

On the other hand, morally moving art can be by its nature morally confrontational and - like Diego Rivera’s and Clemente Orozco’s incandescent inter-War murals - be condemned or destroyed as well as treasured. Yet one underlying quality and generic value across all forms of art is undeniable. *Not one step of art occurs without the felt bonds of being before word, brushstroke or note.*

### 7.11. The First Person Field of Feeling Life: The Value Compass of the World Within

Prior to art, the felt side of being is “the first person” field of value, the directly experiencing inner life of anyone. Although invisible and unexamined as a value field, the principle of life-coherent inclusivity applies to it as much as the moral stand or art which
may express it.

7.11.1. Good and Bad Directions of Felt Being

The value compass of personal emotions – from jealousy and rage to hope and resolve - points in a good or bad direction insofar as it opens or closes the range of the person’s feeling life. Many emotions admit of both possibilities, but any feeling becomes better or worse by this direction - opening to felt life connection, or closing to it. Consider here, for example, the opposite outcome which would have occurred if Othello’s feeling life had opened instead of closed to Desdemona.

Where implosion into white heat passion erupts within, the folk wisdom of “counting to ten first” identifies the choice space familiar in practice, but the onto-ethical nature of this elective space is more or less unknown in philosophy. Eastern wisdom is distinguished by implicit recognition of the transformative potential here - as in the Tantric motto, “Do not repress, but transmute”. Life-value onto-axiology defines this underlying possibility in more exact principle and applies it to all feeling life. In accordance with the primary axiom, felt being is always better the more coherently inclusive it is.

That is, so far as the personal emotion – jealousy, rage, hope, resolve - enables/disables feeling life, it is good/bad in direction. Most emotions admit of both possibilities, but all become better or worse by their direction - opening to felt life connection, or closing to it. Consider here, for example, the opposite outcome which would have occurred if Othello’s jealousy had opened instead of closed to Desdemona.

Where implosion into white heat passion erupts within, the folk wisdom of “counting to ten first” points to the choice space familiar in practice, but onto-ethically unknown. Eastern wisdom, however, provides an implicit principle of value choice within – as expressed by the Tantric motto, “Do not repress, but transmute”. Life-value onto-axiology defines the unifying principle across feeling life. The better is always more coherently inclusive in its felt bonds of being.

7.11.2. Value-Choice of Felt Being in Passionate Love

Passionate love seems an enigma. It is at the heart of tragic, beatific and foolish life experiences in extremes. It can torment and divide people, open to cosmic resonances of joy, or end in banality - all recorded by literatures over millennia. Yet romantic love lacks any known criterion of life value. Even Irving Singer’s monumental three-volume study, the magnum opus of the field, *The Nature of Love* (1966-87), rejects any unifying principle to guide it.

Because disastrous loss of moral bearings often goes with romantic passion, sages across cultures typically decline getting involved in it. In general, it is conceived as against reason by its nature, “leading one about like a slave”, says Socrates. Or, as Sufi poets insist, devotion to Allah. Life-value onto-ethics, in contrast, identifies a choice space towards good and bad directions in all love, with a grounding this-worldly secular standard of life-value to decide which.
7.11.3. Poles of Felt-Life Possibility

Plato’s dialogue, the Symposium, counsels through Socrates and his muse, Diatema, a more famous path - the rational etherealization of erotic love to eventually behold the pure and transcendental form of Beauty itself (210b-212b) - “Platonic love”.

Yet consider the different way of poetry (which Socrates and Plato excluded from the ideal Republic). Alighieri Dante (1275-1321), for example, opened his pubescent longing for the older Beatrice to inner life intimations whose working out evolved into a great literary masterpiece of world culture. He was by no means purified of embodied passion. It was developed and articulated through countless real-life personae of the surrounding religio-moral culture, and leads first through a poetic underworld of dark emotions. While the fleshly tortures in Dante’s Inferno are horrific in themselves, their laying open of the terrors inculcated in the medieval inner life can be read as a transcultural revelation.

7.11.4. Dante’s Divine Comedy illustrates how even the feeling life cauldron need not be repressed, but can be the mover of connecting felt bonds beyond any instinct, cathexis or intellectual ideal. The measure of life value explains what the transcendental Forms of Plato or the rhyming tersets and tropes of method analysis leave frozen – inner-life connections inspiring a cosmos of felt being. What is lacking is principled recognition of this elective value field itself.

7.11.5. Dangerous Drug or Creative Felt Coherence

With no compass for its primary sea of life, feeling life can go bad even if sublimely gratifying in the moment. Passions of attachment may weaken life capacities in fixation. Here romantic love and mood-altering drugs have much in common. Without life coherent connection beyond the love-object, the felt side of being falls inwards into the object. This is where life-value principle marks the direction towards fuller life or draining obsession. Revealingly, the courtly love tradition leads in fact beyond sexual confinement à deux to troubadour poetry and chivalric deeds in wider life connection – the moving line of life-value advance. Yet the line of advance remains without value criterion.

7.11.6. Summarizing the Onto-Ethical Frame of Felt Being

Felt being is always the contour of what anyone lives within as a sentient and feeling organism living in a spatio-temporal world. That is its ontological definition, but its nature as an elective value field has been suppressed. In received ontology, it does not exist. In knowledge theory, the ruling model is restricted to true-false propositions. Yet measure of the felt side of being is by now clear whether of private emotions or the passions of nations. The direction of good or bad is the opening or closing of felt connection whose value measure, in turn, is the margin of its enabling or disabling life through time. At the most basic level - breathing, sentience, needs - feeling life creates value by every degree of more encompassing life field it awakens to and lives.
7.11.6.1. The Field of Feeling and Transformative Value Choice

Connective breathing and inner-life flow, are already long established within prana- and hatha- yoga practices, but the onto-axiology of feeling life exactly defines their value. Even then, these practices only scratch the surface of the felt bonds of being. They can be lost in self desires and satiations within meaningless Schopenhauerean rounds (what Schopenhauer thought unavoidable in the “will to live” itself), or they can be transformed to the better in every moment of what other being enables through countless gifts of means of life.

This movement of feeling life towards all that makes it possible ultimately includes life support systems as humanity’s felt common ground within, the awakening of wider life and meaning. What first peoples have long felt in mythopoeic devotions becomes inclusively coherent. The yoga of life grounding is infinite in felt-value possibility. In any moment, the experiencing of the sky, the sounds of life, the deep draws of breath, the lines of light and growth are living occasions for the horizonless inner life to open to the life-giving round.

7.12. Attacking the Field of Felt Being: The Life-Blind Mechanism of Globalization

Yet what if the clean breath, the open sky, the life-giving foods and water, the sounds and songs of life themselves are cumulatively degraded so that the felt side of being is systematically despoiled? Consider daily life inside a global system of ever more chemically-adulterated foods without nourishment, continuous and ubiquitous motor noise, fumes in the nose and the pores, commercials invading eyes and ears, the moving inner angst of the global race to survive.

Life within can be invaded and occupied in every mode. Yet if externalist models screen it out, how is humanity to know anything is wrong?

7.12.1. Dying Inside Without Knowing It

Without comprehension of the value field of feeling life, humanity is amnesiac in the soul. Driven into the collective life unconscious, a longing for ‘something missing’ builds, but is displaced by endless commodities imaged as natural vistas, life beauty, vibrant health and connectedness which are in fact being stripped away.

Without any coherent life-value standard to tell the better from the worse or the false from the authentic, system-wide violation of the felt bonds of being advance beneath recognition. In the language of Heidegger, there is “forgetfulness of being”. In the language of first nations, “people are without hearts “. The ruling value syntax behind, however, remains undefined.

7.12.2. The Flight from the Life-Ground by Philosophy

Many philosophers like Richard Rorty (1931- ) have denied that there are any universal or objective values at all. So Rorty advocates novels to understand moral issues in the face of the empty formalism of the dominant philosophies. Thus the global mechanism’s
decoupling from shared organic, civil and ecological life requirements is reiterated at the level of philosophical comprehension, and left to fiction to awake us from.

Even rare philosophers who stand for vital life values, like the Marxian-Freudian philosopher of “erogenous life”, Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), cannot find the ground. He instead reifies the elastic mythic category of Eros as an instinctual given with no criterion of value or life supports.

7.13. Phenomenology’s Failures: No Life-Ground or Elective Field of Feeling Value

Marcuse’s wider school of Phenomenology seems at least to meet the problem of the lost inner life. It affirms “lived experience” as ultimate in the face of an epoch of scientific externalism. Yet despite Phenomenology’s philosophical revolt on behalf of lived experience, no elective value field of feeling life emerges to view. Consciousness is reduced to cognitive structures, as with Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Or feeling life dissolves in the dialectical logic of concepts, as with Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831) and Hegelian philosophy today.

Even in his pioneering analysis of “the perceptual milieu” prior to scientific quantification, knowledge justification or causal analysis, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1907-61) fails to recognize any elective life-value field there. He acutely repudiates epistemologists’ beloved “sense data” as intellectual constructions, but the vast sea of feeling life is not identified or value navigated.

The “hermeneutics” (interpretative analysis) of Hans George Gadamer (1900- ) stays with intellectual structures of human experience, and narrows even further by claiming the impossibility of consciousness beyond the prejudices of one’s culture. The “fusion of horizons” he resonantly intimates seems not to apply beyond translation work.

In short, the felt bonds of being human and their elective life-value field do not emerge to phenomenology’s gaze through a century of schools. A strange losing of the felt side of being and its life-ground persists, and the ruling value syntax blocking them out is not recognized.

7.13.1. Life-Value Reduction within the Philosophy of Interiority Itself

In general, the underlying structures of language are what preoccupy phenomenology’s central figures from Hegel through Husserl to Heidegger and Gadamer. Universal values disappear or are harangued. “Values are the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being”, Martin Heidegger proclaims. Being” (Sein) is Heidegger’s undefined fount of all worth, with “forgetfulness of Being” the ultimate problem for him. Life-ground onto-ethics agrees there is forgetfulness of Being, but Heidegger’s “Being” altogether obfuscates shared life-ground requirements and obligations. Final importance is reserved for how the self faces its own end in inescapable annihilation. No organic or life-support meaning emerges beyond certitude of the death of oneself, existential phenomenology’s singular obsession.
7.13.2. Heidegger’s Disconnect From the Life-Ground

Submerged in an onto-ethical “being towards death”, Heidegger involutes into the conventional self which ends at one’s skin. The infinitely wider and deeper connections of human life meaning are lopped off at the material ego’s life span – as in recent philosophy in general. Thus contemporary philosophy’s great affirmer of encompassing Being (Sein) and the depths of human dasein negates the ultimate meaning at the very point of the self’s re-entry into the whole from which it has emerged, itself changed by the life-value contribution which has been completed. Certain death of the individual’s own body irreversibly raises the defining issue of a human being’s “authenticity” while alive, but this ultimate meaning and interface is stripped of its life-ground bearings by Heidegger’s and the era’s confinement within the material ego. The “unconcealment” (alethia) which Heidegger courts as the revelation of Being is thereby disconnected from the evolving social and ecological life-ground which every human being in some way affects by the life-value path which is 'all in'. Heidegger thus misses the ultimate meaning of the individual’s life towards the good or ill of evolving Being, the life-host that does not die but can be destroyed if this egoic reduction of human life continues at the system level. Again the ultimately life-blind syntax of thought unwittingly betrays the life-host.

In overview, we may say that Heidegger’s philosophy like that of his mentor Nietzsche is morally unaccountable to anything beyond self-expansive vision. Grandiose concepts resonate towards a system-transcending “voice”, “call”, “hearing”, “revelation” in a portentously ungrounded verbose emptiness open to evil meaning. The anchorless sea drift of mind in inflated words is, in one of philosophy's great ironies of meaning, brought down to earth in self-important office serving a mass-genocidal system. Heidegger’s “calling of Being to thought” is swept up into service to the Third Reich affirming as new Rector of the University of Freiburg in November 1933 that “the Fuhrer himself and alone is the present and future German reality”.

Submerged in an onto-ethical “being towards death”, wider and deeper connections of life’s meaning are lopped off at the material ego’s life span, or – in the later work – mythicized as a “fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods”. Death of self is doubtless an eternal issue. Yet the issue of “authenticity” it raises is stripped of deeper life-ground bearings. To make a long story short, the “unconcealment” (alethia) which Heidegger courts as the revelation of Being is disconnected from life requirements and ecological ground. It is also morally unaccountable as with his mentor Nietzsche. Grandiose concepts of inner life resonate towards a system-transcending vision - “voice”, “call”, “hearing”, “revelation” - but are portentously vague, and open to evil meaning. Heidegger’s “calling of Being to thought” is swept up in service to the Third Reich - “the Fuhrer himself and alone is the present and future German reality”, Heidegger says as short-term Rector of the University of Freiburg in November 1933.

7.13.3. Inner Life Angst of Existentialism without Wider Moral Meaning

In more resolutely individual form, the decoupling of individual angst from the social and ecological life-ground recurs in the existentialist vision of Albert Camus (1903-60) that human being is “absurd” within an “indifferent universe”. For Camus, the ultimate
philosophical question is whether to commit suicide or not. His answer is to affirm life, but as inherently absurd in the individual condition. His onto-ethical model is the pointless labor of the god-condemned Sisyphus forever rolling a rock uphill, perceived as happy in his commitment.

Again and again, the same underlying pattern recurs. Heidegger and the early Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) feature the felt side of being as primordially overwhelming - “terror”, “anxiety”, dread”, “nausea”, “awe”, “care” resonantly ring in the face of mass meaninglessness and death. Yet although the feeling life is powerfully recognized, it is ungrounded beyond individual life experience. Sartre’s moves to the other end of the political spectrum from Heidegger in his Critique of Dialectical Reason (1972). He affirms revolutionary communism as the wider necessity of existential selves coming together, but entertains political terror as a means to break the “bourgeois seriality of selves”. The later Sartre is made a philosophical non-person, but Heidegger remains studied - a sign of how deeply a ruling value syntax can be internalized beneath comprehension.

7.14. Philosophies of the Dark Psyche: Blind Will, the Id, Archetypes and Inner Compulsion

The philosophical predecessor of Nietzsche (1844-1900) was Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1870). He was the first in modern philosophy to plunge into the felt side of being. Yet one passion alone binds thought – an alleged universal “will to live”. This is the precursor of Nietzsche’s “will to power” upon which he fixates in an opposite way. Schopenhauer negates the will to live, while Nietzsche affirms the will to power. Both conceive of the drive to life/power as total and morally blind. Thus when the felt side of being is finally onto-axiologically recognized in Western philosophy, it is conceived as more reductively brutal than ever.

7.14.1. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: The Will to Life and Power

In his The World as Will and Representation (1818), Schopenhauer conceives the “will to live” as cosmic but degenerate - an eternal round of dissatisfied desires and bored satiation, struggle and pointlessness, succeeding each other in an irreducible “riddle of the world”. The only resolution to this blind round, concludes Schopenhauer, is detachment from the will to live itself.

In direct opposition, Nietzsche’s “will to power” affirms the struggle to live and expand against any such “decadent” quiescence. Yet despite their polar onto-ethical opposition, the ontology of felt being for both of these philosophies remains essentially closed. No choice space exists for feeling life but polar extremes - lifeless detachment, or predatory aggression. Life for Nietzsche in his signature work, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), is “an expression of the will to power”, in which “life is essentially injury, appropriation, conquest of the alien and weaker, imposition of one’s own forms, and, at its mildest, exploitation”. Thus while Nietzsche celebrates and Schopenhauer recoils, both reduce the felt side of life to a monodrive compulsion.
7.14.2. Freud and Jung: Value-Neutral Strategies to Manage the Beast Within

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are followed by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Karl Jung (1875-1961) who continue to feature the dark and irrational side of feeling life. Closure to its open possibilities remains fixed as felt life is bound to the instincts or archetypes which cannot change, but can only be recognized and civilized from above.

Despite their split, Freud and Jung intuited the coming explosion of the dark side’s passions in the fascist interregnum of Europe, Jung having “visions of oceans of blood”. Yet in accord with their grounding of feeling life in pre-set compulsions, neither shows any critical awareness of either the regulating social value system at work deforming the felt side of life, or of the elective field of feeling possibility beyond their instinctual reductions of it.

7.14.3. Paralyzed Conceptions of the Felt Side of Being in Diverse Form

What is in common among classical investigations of the inner felt side of life is that for none is it a field of agency open to life-value transformation. It is given set of drives which can be savagely expressed as a law of nature (Nietzsche), opened to in the “home of language” (Heidegger and Derrida), elicited into conscious recognition (Freud, Jung and psychoanalytic theories in general), understood as ultimately life affirming (Reich, Fromm and Marcuse), or attributed to divine power (Kierkegaard).

7.14.3.1. Competing Philosophies Reveal the Elective Field of Feeling in Denial of It

What is not recognized is that the felt side of being is an elective field whose enabling or disabling direction is decided by its life hosts. It can be gentle as the first peoples of America were said to be by Columbus, or full of corrupt desires as Rousseau (1712-78) said of their European invaders. Or neither, but decided otherwise.

That humanity’s feeling side of life can go any direction is testified to by the contesting theories themselves. Some urge detachment from the will to life itself (Schopenhauer and classical Vedanta and Buddhism), liberation of it as the will to power of Übermenschen over the herd (Nietzscheans and fascism), recognition of the anarchic id’s drives so as to better subdue it by internalized civilized normality (the Freudian schools), comprehension of the collective archetypes of the human psyche whose “primordial images” allow for no escape (Tantric Buddhism and Jungians), or self rewards for conforming behavior to management’s objectives for firm success (behaviorist schedules of reinforcement in corporate systems).

The variety of these positions discloses what is not seen - the range of elective possibility of feeling life insisted upon by the opposing doctrines themselves, each reifying one set-point disposition as natural law.

7.15. The Market: Desires Are the Given that Rationality Calculates to Satisfy

Rational decision and choice theories today go the same route. Self-serving choice is
assumed as natural, individual desire is always for more for self, and rationality decides the most efficient way of getting it. Felt desires are givens for rational maximization of their satisfaction.

Yet once the horizonless inner life of humanity is reduced to self desires alone, it is insatiable. Self-maximizing wants in a global market of competing demands are the limit of feeling life. Desires have no bound, and price and ability to pay alone compute.

7.15.1. Analytic Philosophy Prefigures and Follows the Desiring-Machine Metaphysic

When David Hume (1711-77) says in his Treatise on Human Nature that “this avidity alone of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves or our nearest friends is insatiable, perpetual and universal” (p. 492), his understanding is in tune with the then rising capitalist onto-ethic.

What is thought to save society from ruin is the market which, according to Hume’s fellow deist and friend, Adam Smith, makes everyone’s avarice providentially achieve the public good by the “invisible hand”. With greed a “perpetual and universal” compulsion according even to the skeptic Hume, the possibility of resetting to life-coherent feeling is inconceivable. “Insatiable avidity” is authoritatively fixed as “human nature”, while the common good is left to the market to produce by competition among producers to sell goods.

7.15.2. Innermost Desire: Natural Right of Our Own Group to Rule

In this way, atomic rapacity with no bound is normalized as a law of nature which reason serves and market competition providentially turns into the common good. This is the great doctrinal turn of modernity. National and individual self-interest with no limit but others’ contesting for more is “human nature” - with dominant evolutionary doctrine supporting this metaphysic, and moral-political rationality presupposing it.

A contemporary leader of this inner logic of explanation and rule is Leo Strauss (1899-1973). His doctrine launches a major step beyond Nietzsche. While Nietzsche rejects all moral law for predatory life affirmation, Strauss asserts it as the moral law. “The spirit of capitalism”, he writes in Natural Right and History (1957), is “rightly identified with the view that limitless accumulation of capital and profitable investment of capital is a moral duty, perhaps the highest moral duty” (p. 60).

Strauss’s value system argument may be parsed as follows. The feeling life of humanity is: (i) Reduced to a ruling natural compulsion which (ii) Is for conquest and power over others (iii) Without outer limit of subjugation or accumulation as (iv) Natural moral law entailing (v) An unconditional duty of globalizing private capital rule.

Strauss’s onto-ethic directly expresses the value syntax of private money-sequence gain. The Nazi regime of Germany from the 1930's to 1945 also appealed to the absolute right of
“our own group” to subjugate other cultures for civilization - an old theme. Strauss academicizes this value logic by Talmudic selections from the classics of Western political philosophy. The felt side of being can lead anywhere. In this mode, the propensity of “feeling universal” affirms beast-of-prey greed on a group level as moral duty. Strauss has been most of all followed as a “philosopher king” by leading insiders of the national security elite of the United States.

7.15.3. Strauss, Freud and the Common Ground of Life-Blind Master Drives

Although Freudian philosophy does not move to the political level as Strauss does, it declares an anarchic unconscious of immutable drives, “the id”, which wants to murder parents and requires repression by the “conscious ego” and the external order it internalizes as “the superego”. Again, pathological drive is the set-point of theory. Yet it is not affirmed by Freud as with Nietzsche, or moralized as with Strauss. Freud seeks its pacification by psychoanalytic recognition.

Nonetheless the common ground remains life-blind compulsion of the felt side of being. No elective life-value field of feeling life is conceived. This is the underlying pattern across theories.

7.15.4. Character Armor over Eros: The Trials and Limits of Wilhelm Reich

Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957) goes in an opposite direction. A radical disciple of Freud, he argues that Freud accepts the given patriarchal-capitalist order as a given, and so the inner life of Eros is “armored” and “perverted” by systemic social repressions legitimated by psychoanalysis itself.

Reich’s critique is life-affirming. Its limitations are that it grounds in animal instinct, and provides no criterion of life value. As all psychoanalytic theory, it never penetrates to ecological systems as life-ground. Reich instead reifies “orgone energy” as a cosmic energy to be tapped by the external devices he invents.

Reich was persecuted to his death in a U.S. federal prison. He was ostracized by all sides - the professional psychiatric community which expelled him, the U.S. government which imprisoned him and burnt his research journals, and the Communist Party which abhorred his “sexual libertinism”. The primeval inner world of “the dark instincts” still remains given in psychoanalysis - with “civilization” the legitimating category for the ruling value syntax which is presupposed but not open to examination.


There are recurrent efforts to break out of the invisible prison, and one of these is by affirming that “all is love and alive” in a universe drawn by felt attractions. This is a view espoused by Alfred North Whitehead (1871-1947) and by Empedocles far before him (495-375 BCE). A metaphysical question arises. Does the value field of felt being extend to inanimate being?
7.16.1. Whitehead’s Process Ethics: All Is Alive

Whitehead says yes. The senior author of *Principia Mathematica* with Bertrand Russell, he completely rejects the “externalist” and “inert” view of matter associated with Newtonian physics. He claims that quanta of light are themselves “throbs of experience” which he explains as “internally related” in their continuous flows and continuities of connected change and growth.

What we think of as “dead matter”, Whitehead argues in *Process and Reality* (1929) and *Modes of Thought* (1938), is really alive as primitively feeling and purposing flows. The energies of physics constitute for him the most elementary level of the cosmic body of an immanent and pervasively interconnected “unity of experience” which Whitehead calls “God”.

7.16.2. Does Whitehead Contradict the Primary Axiom of Value?

Life-value analysis observes, in contrast, that to have a felt side of being requires a nervous system. If no evidence is produced for the feeling life of inorganic forces beyond equivocal concepts like “throb” and “flow”, then Whitehead’s position has no evident basis.

Whitehead distinctively valorizes imagination. Yet he does not claim or imply poetic license here. Rather he directly reverses the error of mechanical externalism. One erases and the other totalizes life presence. Life-value onto-axiology does neither. It demands coherence with life requirements. ‘Knowledge’ which strips out the value-field of feeling is life-blind. Yet cosmology which claims feeling life where none exists is life-blind in another way.

7.16.3. Criteria of Life Which Can Feel

What does not have feeling life can be told by exact criteria which have been avoided. *Nothing is alive if it must be turned on and off or if all its parts can be removed and replaced with sustained function*. These criteria decisively resolve debate on what is conscious or feeling, and what is not. Yet a wide constituency for confusion about the felt side of life persists.

For example, Whitehead says in *Modes of Thought* (1938) that “the key notion [of this systematic cosmology] is that the energetic activity considered in physics is the *emotional intensity* entertained in life” (p. 168, emphasis added). Observe the equational “is” in this defining claim. It follows that heated gases and hydro-wire currents experience “emotional intensity”.

7.16.4. Profound Moral Incoherence Implied

Whitehead relies on “direct insight” - as the Vedanta does with darsana, Moore with ethical intuitionism, and so on. Yet intuitions may overlook very serious matters. It makes all the difference here whether something is alive and feels, or is not. Feeling life by its nature requires moral regard for its feeling life: especially if it is being incapacitated,
maimed or killed. Yet if energies which physics describes do feel emotional intensity, then why do Whitehead and like thinkers show no moral concern whatever about standard practices of terminating and setting fire to them? This reductio ad absurdum has not been met.

7.16.5. Human Heartedness: The Standard of Being Human

In contrast, the vision of a “fellowship of all creatures” does not claim the aliveness of inorganic processes. For example, the “jen” or “human-heartedness” of Chinese classical philosophy as explained by philosophers like Wang-Yang Ming (1472-1529) and K’ang Yu-Wei (1858-1927) means that “the sage forms one body with all the 10,000 beings” in a universal “feeling of one kind”. “Forming of one body with all beings” does not, however, claim the inorganic itself feels the human heart or emotions.

This “universal self“ or “soul” is a position which ecological philosopher, Arne Naess (1912- ) also suggests in awareness of the classical Hindu and Buddhist traditions which assert it as our ultimate ground - atman in the Vedanta, pratityasamutpada in Buddhism.

7.16.6. Defining the Life Subject and Measure

The all-inclusive possibility of human thought and feeling as a unifying subject across physical differences is underwritten by life-value onto-axiology. What is different is that principled distinctions between life and non-life, more valuable and less valuable life, are demarcated by exact criteria identifying degrees of life-value range.

7.17. Ecology without Axiology: Diamond and Lovelock and the Capitalist Value System

Ecosystem sciences err in the opposite way from Whitehead. They conceive ecological interconnection with life value and feeling extruded a-priori by the requirements of ‘value-neutral‘ scientific method.

Although scientific knowledge about “industrial overloading of ecosystem capacities” and such lead expert awareness of system problems, these sciences cannot in principle identify the value system which selects for this overloading, and moreover lack any axiological training to do so.

7.17.1. Jared Diamond’s Collapse and the Gaia Hypothesis

Jared Diamond’s work Collapse (2005) representatively founders at this level. It provides rich evidence of past ecosystem collapses, but nowhere analyzes the ruling value mechanism behind them, least of all in the global case. In itemizing physical factors of collapse, Diamond follows in the accepted path of scientific externalism with no onto-axiological analysis conceived.

“Values” are raised, but as a slogan for social behaviors. “Choices” are recognized, but with no concept of life-value except “survival”. Under the index category of “globalization
and environmental problems”, vacancy of value bearings becomes one-sided focus on an alien order, communist China (pp. 358-59, 379-83). “Globalization” itself is innately assumed to “mean nothing more than improved worldwide communications” (p. 517). Here we may see by its absence how imperative value-system analysis is.

7.17.2. The “Gaia hypothesis” from contemporary biologist James Lovelock (1919- ) also leads in following the dynamics of ecological breakdown at a system level. Indeed, he uniquely lets the felt side of being into his analysis, but only to project it onto the earth as itself what feels. The value-system mechanism explaining the collapse is again abstracted out, while the feeling value field is externalized onto Gaia (the mythic category meaning “earthmother”).

In his seminal work, Gaia: A New Look At Life on Earth (1979), Lovelock describes the earth as a single living being which alters the planetary environment as necessary in order for it to survive. The world personified as Gaia itself responds to the mounting violations of global ecosystems as an immanent eco-God. It engineers system feedbacks to stop the planetary ecocide. As for the global capitalist value-system which life-blindly loots and pollutes the planet, it remains unspeakable. Instead an value-empty agency of “humanity” in abstracto is held responsible. The system causal mechanism and its required restructuring are both screened out.

Response to the ruling disorder is where the action is, and it is displaced onto Gaia which operates as an implacably avenging Fate - The Revenge of Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back (2006). What governs the planet’s material reproduction and ecological evolution by technological reconstruction, habitat elimination and massive alteration of carrying and sink capacities to expand its money sequences continues unidentified; while the imperative of system resetting to life coherence is not explained.

7.17.3. The Imperative of Life-Value Compass for the System Disorder

Again we may observe the closed circle of conception. The underlying disorder and steering agency needed is blocked out by the regulating value logic of the disorder itself. Even when catastrophic effects are recognized rather than denied, the ruling system of which they are cumulative consequences remains unexamined, and its inner driver is assumed natural.

Many seek instead a human-made solution to a system-made problem. Yet no value-system analysis of the determining axiological mechanism is spoken in the centers of philosophy, economics or public leadership. On the contrary, universal values to ground in are assumed impossible in value theory itself. This is the invisible prison. As in past system collapses, there is normalized disconnection from the requirements of the underlying life support systems.

7.18. Why Love and Compassion Require Life Support Systems

Princeton professor of law and long-time human rights leader, Richard Falk, has recommended a religious response to the growing world crisis in his Religion and Humane
Social Governance (2001). Here we see what is unusual in the contemporary academy – a recommended solution based on religion. The long-enduring ideal of universal love in which all are joined as one is the inner meaning - whether the binding felt identity of God, Jesus Christ, Allah, or Buddha-mind.

While such visions open feeling life beyond the reason-emotion split and externalist denial, there is a profound problem to all of them. Their received forms lack life-grounded bearings of ultimate concern. Yet without material life coordinates and purpose, no spiritual vision can overcome life-blind systems of rule. It is inadequate to the task in principle.

7.18.1. Does Buddhism meet the Challenge to Feeling Life?

On the face of it, Mahayana Buddhism opens and tracks the felt side of being more inclusively than any other value system. The “boundless compassion” (karuna) it advocates moves the parameters of feeling to entirely wider ranges than most philosophy conceives. It also opens the felt bonds of being far beyond the Varna-caste structure of Hinduism, devotional submission to Allah, and Christian limitation of the Incarnation.

Tantric Buddhism also offers an upgrading path for this-worldly passions. The Tibetan Buddhist Tantrayana, has turbulent and wrathful “deities”, that is, powerful psychological propensities, to which Freudians and Jungians respond with positive recognition. With Buddhism rejecting supernaturalist design and already widespread East and West, does it offer the pathway ahead?

7.18.2. The Problem of Buddhism: Universal Interiority without a Life-Ground

The decisive limitation of Buddhist philosophy is that its classical first principles deny life substance itself. Entities are illusory (“no things”, or anicca), and human beings are without organic identities (“no selves”, or anatta). On the general level, embodied life is a realm of suffering by its nature (dukkha) without ultimate emancipation except by extinction of embodied identification (Nirvana). There is no life ground of consciousness. No life support system may be depended on or attached to. Social and natural life support systems are again, by different route, disconnected from in principle.

In place of a positive life-value onto-ethic, Buddhism’s classical path is a via negativa - non-attachment to life forms, supports and life itself. Consciousness seeks final release from material life as the mission and goal - “with no base remaining” in the words of the canonical Mahayana text, Madhyamika (“the middle way”). In the earlier Theravada, aggregates of atomic point instances “brief as winks” constitute an illusory world without natural and social life supports.

7.18.3. The White Light Field: Re-Grounding the Ultimate Experience of Felt Life

Nonetheless spiritual philosophies have opened felt being to its most sublime experience of the “white light consciousness field”, as we may name it, to which mystic literatures have differently given testimony across major religions. Yet although a summum bonum from the Kabbalah to the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the notion of a “white light field” of experience
cannot make sense through the normal habit-frames of feeling. When reported, it is projected onto a transcendent source with no this-worldly ground.

Yet the felt side of human life is clearly connected to the sun center of the material solar system from which all life energy is derived, while infinite permutations of a human neuron system provide the embodied vehicle of white-light experiences. Yet here again spiritual philosophies including Buddhism disown or do not connect to their material grounds - and so also, the ultimate obligation to sustain them as feeling life’s condition of this-worldly possibility.

7.18.3.1. Reclaiming the Life-Ground for Spiritual Interiority

In contrast, a life-coherent philosophy takes into account the natural and social conditions of feeling life and its limitless connective capacities. It recognizes what enables it to be what it is - every condition of terrestrial atmosphere and climate, natural and social life infrastructures, secure dwelling and nourishment, vocation of life contribution - in short, all the conditions of humanity’s existence and flourishing on earth.

A life-grounded account of the felt bonds of being points to the secular model of Jesus who, self-described as “the son of man”, bridges the felt “kingdom of heaven within” to systematic material obligations - release of “the poor”, “the hungry”, “the homeless”, “the sick”, and “the imprisoned”. Against these duties he opposes the “master of money” which “you cannot serve”.

This universal vision of feeling life is very clear. It is not recognized, however, because it cannot pass through filters of the ruling value syntax. “Human nature” is assumed incapable of such life solidarity. Reconciling Humanity and the Beast bridges this abyss of meaning.

Glossary

Agent-relative: A standard philosophical term signifying individual choice as in “agent-relative ethics” which assumes that value agency is confined to individuals.

Analytic philosophy: An umbrella term covering any school or method of philosophy for which logical rigor and distinctions are prioritized and referents restricted to linguistic entities.

Anti-foundationalism: A generic term for the dominant trend of philosophy over the recent century whose unifying characteristic is denial of any universal truths or values.

A-priori: Derived independently of sense experience e.g., 2+2=4. Truth by definition and tautological deduction is the mathematical model, but presuppositions are often falsely assumed a-priori.

A-posteriori: “After the fact”, dependent on sense experience.

Agent-relative: A standard philosophical term signifying individual choice as
“agent-relative ethics” which assumes that value agency is confined to individuals.

**Axiology:**
From the Greek, *axioma*, “what is thought to be worthy”, the ultimate, but under-theorized category of value reason, ideally building from rationally self-evident bases or *axioms* of value a complete system of value (aesthetic, epistemological, moral, etc.) with unlimited validity across domains. Onto-axiology is axiology which grounds in the nature of being.

**Biophilia:**
A term coined by Erich Fromm which means “love of life” which he distinguishes from its opposite “necrophilia”, the “love of death” or repressive inflexibility. Biophilia is distinguished from life-value onto-axiology in attending only to the affective or felt side of life affirmation without principled distinctions among fields and ranges of life value and disvalue.

**Capitalism:**
A socioeconomic system in which all values are conceived in money terms and maximum sale of commodities for maximum private profit is the ultimate value governor of thought and action. (Strictly speaking, the adjective money before capitalism is required to ensure distinction from other forms of capital).

**Civil commons:**
A unifying concept to designate social constructs which enable universal access to life goods. Life support systems are civil commons so far as society protects and enables their reproduction and provision for all members.

**Coherence theory of truth:**
That a belief is true so far as it is consistent with a whole system of beliefs. See Life coherence principle.

**Correspondence theory of truth:**
In general, the ancient idea that claims must correspond to facts to be true. This idea has given rise to questions about what are the criteria of “facts” and “correspondence”, to which the reigning answer is scientific confirmation. See Validity.

**Collective life unconscious:**
Distinguished from Karl Jung’s psychoanalytic (or as he calls it “analytic”) category of the “collective unconscious” as the collective *life* unconscious with Jung’s archetypal collective unconscious a secondary expression of it. For example, Jung considers the figure of Goethe’s *Faust* as an “archetype” of the collective unconscious. There is the “conscious soul” of the on-the-brink-of-suicide philosopher, Faust, and the “unconscious soul” of Mephistopheles, the “shadow self” and “true spirit of life against the arid scholar”, which is expressed in destructive form because it is unrecognized and repressed. In life-ground onto-ethics, the collective life unconscious admits of this level of analysis, but grounds the split between consciously organizing regime and unconscious shadow realm at a deeper level of disconnection of ruling values from life-ground itself on both individual and collective planes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common life interest:</td>
<td>A concept which disambiguates the categories of “the common interest”, “the public interest”, and so on to specify what these concepts normally omits the shared life support systems of all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental philosophy:</td>
<td>A standard way of distinguishing contemporary European philosophy and method from Analytic philosophy. See also Existentialism, Marxism, Phenomenology, and Postmodernism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep ecology:</td>
<td>A movement founded by Arne Naess opposing “shallow ecology” or environmental resourceism, whose defining idea (without definition of “values in themselves” or “needs”) is that “the well-being and flourishing of non-human life have value in themselves independent of their usefulness for human purposes” and “humans have no right to reduce the richness and diversity of life forms except to satisfy vital needs”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequentialism:</td>
<td>Often equated to utilitarianism, but strictly holding that the good or bad is to be found in its consequences, not its principle of action or intention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontological ethics:</td>
<td>Essentially, “duty ethics”, standardly opposed to utilitarianism insofar as it holds that good lies in the principle or duty which action embodies, not its consequences of happiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire theory of value:</td>
<td>A concept to designate any theory of value which conceives all values in terms of individual desire objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinism:</td>
<td>A problematic term typically, but falsely, counterposed to freedom of choice. The meaning adopted by life-ground onto-axiology is to delimit (de-termine) a known range of material possibility within which individual or collective choices can occur otherwise put, individual and social freedom of choice within material limits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development:</td>
<td>A central term of value in contemporary global discourse which does not distinguish between opposed forms of development or growth - for example, more commodities sold for profit (market development/growth) and more means of life available for people’s lives (human development/growth).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Either-or reduction:</td>
<td>A regulating structure of normative thinking which assumes the logical form of p or not-p (“the excluded middle”), thereby eliminating the range of other value possibilities, including degrees of each in mutual inclusion - for example, assuming that a society is either capitalist or socialist, that an ethic is either consequentialist or deontological, or that a phenomenon is either good or bad. See also Dualism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology:</td>
<td>This is a central field of philosophy concerned with the nature, grounds and limits of knowledge a generally unrecognized realm of value judgment and theory insofar as judgments rest on elective norms of “true” and “false” and “valid” and “invalid”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics:</td>
<td>That which is concerned with what is good and bad in human</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
action, including competing positions of utilitarianism, deontological/formalist/duty ethics, emotivism/non-cognitivism, evolutionary ethics, intuitionism, naturalism, perfectionism, phenomenological ethics, postmodern ethics, subjectivism/pluralism/relativism, self-realization/teleological ethics, and virtue ethics. Perhaps the most enduring received meta-ethical debate is between consequentialism (judging by consequences, e.g., utilitarianism) and non-consequentialism (judging by the intrinsic principle of judgment and action e.g., Platonism and Kantianism). Moral philosophy is often equated to Ethics, but is in principle more restricted in reference to ought-to statements which entail prescriptions or prohibitions whose violation is thought to deserve guilt or punishment.

**Existentialism:** Classically defined by Jean-Paul Sartre as “existence precedes essence”, which means that human choice of what one does (existence) precedes any set fate, determinism, role or external design with those denying responsibility of choice being in “bad faith” (*mauvais foi*).

**Externalism:** Any standpoint or theory which denies the inner fields of thought and feeling or, conversely, restricts reality to space-occupying states.

**Fields of life value:** This concept refers to the fields of thought (concept and image), felt side of being (sentient and affective), and action (organic movement through space-time), the triune parametric of all value whatever as explained by the Primary Axiom of Value.

**Globalization:** A concept which admits of different meanings but whose dominant meaning is globalization of money capitalism. See Capitalism.

**Human value identity:** This is a concept which understands value identity as that which is identified with by a self as its value meaning.

**Inclusivity principle:** The more coherently inclusive the taking account of - whether in thought, feeling, action or all together - the higher the value understanding is.

**Intrinsic and instrumental value:** What is a good in itself and what is good as a means.

**Internal and external goods:** This is the basic distinction between what is a good in itself and what is a good as an external possession.

**Life-blind norms:** A characteristic tendency of the ruling value systems of established societies and of their received ideologies to blinker out the life-disabling effects of their regulating principles.

**Life coherence principle, or ‘the full coherence** Whereby positions or systems must be consistent with (1) factual premises and (2) valid inferences, so as (3) to enable rather than disable life and life-systems if they are to qualify as fully rational or
principle': valid.

Life-unconscious: The life-unconscious arises out of life desires being conditioned to repressive forms – for example, the desire for oneness with life conditioned to be a craving for a power-machine vehicle dominating nature. See Bernays, Edward W. in Bibliography.

Life-Ground: Most simply expressed, all of the conditions required to take the next breath, or life support systems in their entirety.

Life sequence of value: The process whereby any body of life becomes more life by means of life a process which admits of regressive, reproductive and progressive modes and degrees, each measurable by the criteria of more/less fields of life enabled or enjoyed through time.

Life standards: Those principles and laws which protect and enable human and ecological life systems.

Life-value metric: more/less life range in any domain or degrees of life function or expression.

Life-value onto-axiology: The value-system which regards life and means of life to more coherently comprehensive ranges of life as the ultimate and universal good. (Also referred to as life-value onto-ethic when emphasis is on the normative dimension of the axiology.)

Linguistic behaviorism: Any theory or school of thought which adopts language expressions as its sole referent and excludes the inner world or “fields” of thought and feeling.

Linguistic turn: Major philosophical movement of the twentieth century associated with the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, but moving far beyond Wittgenstein and his school in its influence (e.g., anti-foundationalism, postmodernism). By confining philosophical problems and discourse to issues of language or sign systems, the l.t. implicitly disconnects philosophy and reflective inquiry from the material problems of the world.

Measures of life value: These refer to the ranges of the fields of life value which are maintained, gained or lost in reference to a prior or compared state (e.g., in the felt side of being, non-affect at scenes of death or numbness to loud noise), measured by margin gain or loss.

Mechanism: Doctrines according to which all phenomena are matter in motion or governed and predictable by physics-like laws. See also Mechanical reduction.

Mechanical reduction: Whatever reduces life or life-systems to mechanical systems so as to rule out non-mechanical life properties (e.g., the irreversibility of life processes, non-substitutability of constituents, or fields of internal life).

Meta-Ethics: The study of the nature of moral judgment conventionally preoccupied with the logical status of ought and taxonomies of
competing theories in exclusion of substantive moral issues.

**Metaphysics:** The ultimately regulating principles of existence (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology) referred to as “metaphysic” when a doctrine lacks consciousness of the underlying principles of its assertion.

**Money sequence of value:** Using anything whatever as means (including money derivatives) to turn private money sums into greater quantities in reiterated choice paths of money-value adding.

**Moral Philosophy:** Moral philosophy is often equated to Ethics, but is in principle more restricted in reference to ought-to statements which entail prescriptions or prohibitions whose violation is thought to deserve guilt or punishment. See also Ethics.

**Natural kinds:** A concept introduced by Saul Kripke to refer to basic names like those for water or the human species which retain their meaning in every context whatever, and which are “rigid designators” of their referents - not merely conventional signs but necessary in all worlds.

**Objective Values:** Values which are independent of individuals’ affirming them (e.g., the values of universal life support systems like the earth’s atmosphere).

**Onto-axiology:** A concept which supersedes the standard reductionist split between ontology (the philosophy of being) and ethics/axiology (general theory of good and bad).

**Pareto Optimum (or Pareto efficiency):** A standard ideal of philosophical and economic rationality in which no-one can be made better off without making someone else worse based on pure-type dyadic exchanges of private assets *in vacuo*.

**Phenomenology:** A major school of contemporary philosophy in which human consciousness as such is adopted as the direct object of analysis prior to the subject-object distinction, causal explanation or scientific claims.

**Pragmatism:** An a-posteriori theory of knowledge and value whose defining idea is “what works”. Naturalistic, experimentalist, developmental, and instrumentalist in its various forms, it repudiates all dualisms, but like science does not answer the question ‘works for what?’

**Primary Axiom of Value:** $x$ is of value if and only if, and to the extent that, $x$ consists in or enables more coherently inclusive thought/felt being/action. See also Fields of life value.

**Proposition:** A statement in language that is or can be verified as true or false.

**Proceduralism:** A generic pattern of leading philosophies of value which assume that universal values can only be implicit in or decided by procedures of argument (e.g., “contractarian” models of justice and norms of “the ideal speech situation”), and whose rational
“procedures” distinguish different schools.

**Relativism:** A generic term for the view that there are no objective or universal values because all values are by their nature relative to the contingent cultures, preferences, individuals, practices and world-views in which they are embedded.

**Ruling Value-System:** A society’s value-system presupposed by those governed by it which ultimately regulates the decision norms and goals of the society’s dominant social institutions, individual roles within them, and the thought structure of those internalizing it.

**Second-order Shift:** A move from first-order value-system (e.g., to maximize pecuniary possessions or equivalents) to a second-order level of value understanding and choice within which the first-order value-system is one regulating possibility.

**Social injustice:** Systematic suffering from need by the life-capacity loss entailed by the deprivation of life means. Social justice is the process of overcoming it.

**Soul:** The feeling core of life opening beyond self as the felt bonds of being.

**Transcendental deduction:** Logical analysis in which the necessary presuppositions of the intelligibility of a claim or position are deduced from it as self-evident (e.g., the necessary presupposition that all humanity is European in the statement “Columbus discovered America”).

**Universal life goods:** All goods *without* which human life capacities are reduced or destroyed (e.g., breathable air, potable water, means of expression for free speech).

**Validity:** From the Latin, *validus*, or strong, usually reduced to rigorous logical consistency of inferences from premises (philosophy) or replicatable demonstration of empirical claims (science), with neither required to be consistent with life requirements. See Life Coherence Principle.

**Value neutrality:** A standard which is claimed when a value-system is so deeply taken for granted that its outcomes appear as value free although achieved by the regulation of strict criteria of value and value judgment (e.g., the canons of scientific method).

**Value syntax:** Organizing principles of pro-and-con meaning, prescription, position and transformation which regulate a value system, but may be invisible to those who presuppose it. In the ruling value syntax of contemporary global society, the subject is money capital whose verb is seeking to become more without upper limit, and all modifiers are money-demand or its equivalents.

**Value-system** Any stable set of regulators of judgment and action, whether or not the value deciders are recognized.
Yoga

A concept derived from the Sanskrit “yongere” meaning “to join” or “yoke”, it has countless varieties in Hinduism and (less so) Buddhism, but usually implies a joining or yoking to a divine or transcendental field of energy.

Bibliography

Adorno, Max (1966/19730, Negative Dialectics 178pp. New York: Continuum. [This is an ont-epistemological work of the Frankfurt Critical Theory school which argues for dialectical thinking to dissolve conceptual forms before they harden into distorting lenses of experience.]

Arendt, Hannah (1964), Origins of Totalitarianism. 520 pp. New York: Meridian. [Classic study of the nature of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin whose striking insights into such phenomena as “the negative solidarity of alienated masses” are not generalized into explanatory principles applying beyond these alien regimes.]


Aristotle(1995), The Complete Works of Aristotle (ed. J. Barnes), Princeton: Princeton University Press [Includes Aristotle’s most famous work in ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, as well as his other works in normative philosophy and value theory, Eudemian Ethics, Economics, Politics, and Virtues and Vices.]


Aurobindo Ghose (1989), The Life Divine.1112pp. Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram.[The author’s greatest work which is distinguished by its dynamic, evolutionary conception of God in which the material world is not considered illusory as in Shankara’s and Buddha’s “illusionism”, but is in perpetual transformation from the Subconscient All through Desire-Force to Mind (instrumental reason), Supermind (world consciousness), and Gnostic Consciousness (the all experiencing itself as all in all).]

Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth and Logic (1936), 160 pp. New York: Dover. [This classical statement of the once dominant school of “logical positivism” holds that since there are not observations that prove value statements as true or false, they are meaningless.]

Bacon, Francis (1620/1963), Novum Organum, 135pp. New York: Washington Square Press.[The origin of modern scientific method is standardly attributed to Bacon’s 1620 essay which adopts the machine as its model, the beginning of centuries of scientific and philosophical mechanism dominant to the present day, from scientific economics to models of the mind.]

Becker L.C. ed. (2000), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 641pp. London GB: Routledge [This is the definitive comprehensive text in the field by experts in the areas of published philosophy up to the end of the twentieth century, and provides the widest representation of value theory formally available. McMurty’s essay entries on “Competition” and “Forms of Consciousness” define and explain primary but under-examined ethical categories of understanding feeling life.]

Berger, John (1975), Ways of Seeing, 169 pp. London: BBC-Penguin.[Berger’s classic text begins “the relationship between what we see and what we know is never settled”, laying bare ruling-value dimensions of famous visual art objects.]

Bemecker, S. and Dretske, F. (2000), Knowledge, 595 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [This is a state-of-the-art sourcebook of contemporary Anglo-American epistemology featuring definitive chapters by Austin, Ayer, Bonjour, Chisolm, Davidson, Goodman, Kripke, Lewis, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, Strawson and others featuring the standard criterion of knowledge as true, justified belief, with methodological elision of life-coherence requirements.]

Bernays, Edward W. (1933), Propaganda, 159 pp. New York: Liverright. [This is a revealing book by a
nephew of Freud and a primary pioneer of Wall Street modern mass-market conditioning who explains how media appeal to unconscious desires to sell commodities and engineer consent, and why this is necessary for control of the masses with more than they need.

Bok, Sissela (1995), Common Values, 130 pp. Columbia MO: Missouri University Press [One of the few philosophical works which analyzes social moral systems and seeks a common core of values across cultures: but without any criterion of needs or relationship of the “minimalist norms” to the basic “biological survival needs”.

Brentano, F. (1969), The Origin Of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. New York: Humanities Press. [An eminent modern representation of ethical idealism wherein values are conceived as akin to a-priori mathematical truths of which there are “correct” and “incorrect” understandings with no life-ground.]

Broome, J. (1999), Ethics Out of Economics, 267 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [This analysis criticizes “the shifted sense of utility” in neoclassical economies over the last century, arguing that the directive principle of utilitarianism is an impartial principle of happiness production not economic self-maximization: but without a criterion of happiness itself.]


Camus, A. (1955), Myth of Sisyphus, 169 pp. London: H. Hamilton Co. [This includes Camus’ best known work which the uses the Greek myth of Sisyphus as an allegory of the human condition in which individual projects are ultimately meaningless but are redeemed by the commitment to them, “I imagine S. as happy.”]

Casteneda, Carlos (1987), The Power of Silence, 287pp. New York: Simon and Shuster Pocket Books. [Fifteen years later than the earlier and better-known The Teachings of Don Juan: a Yaqui way of Knowledge, this is most principled and summative account of Castenada’s study of indigenous knowledge as lying in the transformation of perception by the act of “intent” over the reductive “objectivity” of scientific rationality.]

Chan, W. (1963), Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy, 856 pp. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press [This is the definitive and comprehensive collection of classical Chinese Philosophy from Confucius to K’angYu-Wei, providing texts across millennia on “the Great Norm”, jen or “human-heartedness”, and “the Tao”. It includes the whole Tao-te Ching by Lao tzu, and Ch’an Buddhist writings as well as Confucian and Neo-Confucian canons.]


Dawkins, R. (1976), The Selfish Gene, 224 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Most widely influential and generically ambitious text of contemporary evolutionary biology featuring explanation by “the selfish replicators of genes and memes” by whose “universal ruthless selfishness” human actions are explained as expressions of “gene machines”].

Dennett, Daniel (1995), Consciousness Explained, 511 pp. Boston, Little, Brown [This standard work reduces consciousness to functional states of the brain so that feelings are identical to information-processing states of the brain computer.]

Descartes, R. (1637-41/1996), trans. Weissman, D. And Bluhm W. T., Discourse on method and Meditations on first philosophy. 383 pp. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. [Often conceived as the father of modern philosophy, Descartes’ work has been most famous in its dualistic conception of human being - the mind or res cognitans as the immaterial and indivisible substance, and the body or res extensa as unfeeling “division, shape and motion.” His mathematical mechanism has remained a model of scientific understanding into the present.]

Dewey, John (1925), Experience and Nature, 443pp. Chicago: Open Court. [This is Dewey’s most substantial work explaining his philosophy of experience whose experimentalist logic of knowing rejects all dualisms, highlights felt immediacy against merely abstract cognition, and integrates democracy and education into the process of intelligent life growth.]


Doyle, Ian and Gough, Len (1991), *A Theory of Human Need*, 365 pp. New York: Guilford Press [One of the few works on needs as a basic category of value, it distinguishes between needs and need satisfiers, but does not penetrate to any universal principle of needs across cultures.]


Edgeworth, Frances (1881[1932]). *Mathematical Psychics*, London: London School of Economics. [This is a formative work of ont-axiological economic mechanism in which it is assumed that “the conception of man as a pleasure machine may justify the employment of mechanical terms and mathematical reasoning in social science”.

Edwards, Paul (1967), *Philosopher’s Index*, 8 volumes. London: Macmillan [This is the most comprehensive and detailed encyclopedia of world philosophy in existence.]


Epictetus (trans. R. Dobb, 2008), *Discourses and Encheiridion*, 276pp. London: Penguin. [This is the latest complete work by Epictetus as transcribed by his student, Arrion, setting out in aphoristic style his Stoic classic which argues for the primacy of choice in experience mediated by reason wherein “none can harm one”.


Fleck, Ludwik (1929/1979), *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact* (trans. Bradley F. and Trenn T.), 121 pp. Chicago: Chicago University Press [This work shows how a received “thought system” of science can structure facts so that what does not fit the received scientific view is explained away.]

Foucault, M. (1984), *The Foucault Reader* (ed. P. Rabinow), 390 pp. New York: Pantheon. [This is the best available collection of Foucault’s corpus leading the postmodern turn against all universalist categories for the contingency and twisted particularity of determining penal, sexual and scientific institutions of the knowledge/power axes.]

Freire, Paulo (1967), *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 243 pp. Boston: Beacon Press. [Contemporary classic in philosophy of human liberation by “desubmerging consciousness” to understand and confront structures of oppression – with the words on the board as feeling becoming liberation.]

Freud, Sigmund (1989), *The Ego and the Id*. 86pp.New York: Norton and Co. [This is a selection from the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud* focusing on his theory of the “seething cauldron of the id” constituted of “the fixed instincts” as explaining the felt side of being in relationship to “all that it is not”, the conscious self or “ego”.


divine atman and the selfish forces of avidity.]


Great Law of Peace of the Longhouse Peoples. Akwesasne: White Roots of Peace, 1971. [Fire councils open with poetic tribute to life support systems as ultimate ground of the lives of all “expressing gratitude to the earth where men dwell, to the streams of water - the maize and fruits - to the animals that serve as food - to the great winds - and to the sun”.

Hartmann, Nicolai (1950), Ethics. 821 pp. London: Allen and Unwin. [Originally published in Germany as Ethik in 1926, follows an ancient philosophical tendency since Plato to conceive moral values as akin to pure mathematical forms whose objective certitude is eternal and independent of perception of them.

Heidegger, M. (1996), Being and Time, 487 pp. Albany N.Y: State. [This is Heidegger’s magnum opus crystallizing his study of philosophy from the pre-Socrates and pioneering contemporary existential phenomenology, featuring the elusive idea of Being (Sein) as the forgotten ground of philosophy, the struggle of individual being against the “they-sell” (das Man), and the “being towards death” that sets the defining issue for the individual (Dasein).

Hobbes, Thomas (1651/1958), The Leviathan. Parts One and Two, 299 pp. New York: Liberal Arts Press. [The first classic of the liberal canon, arguing on a mechanistic basis that men are matter in motion moved by appetites and aversion, above all towards “power after power that ceaseth only in death” - until the “Leviathan” state which “bears their persons” and imposes the order by which all are made to live in peace by fear of it.]


Hume, David (1960/1888), A Treatise of Human Nature, 709pp. Oxford: Clarendon Press [This is Hume’s classic study in which a turning point in philosophy towards what is now called “instrumental reason” characterizing the relation of reason to the passions as the opposite to the classical conception: reason is rightly “slave of the passions - to serve and obey them”.

Huxley, Aldous (1956/1990), The Doors of Perception-Heaven and Hell, 185 pp. New York: Harper and Row. [Deploying William Blake’s concept of “the doors of perception”, this is Huxley’s classic account of epistemological experimentation with mescaline-peyote in which “the brain’s reducing valve” of habit-formed selective perception is suspended with opposite possibilities of experience, “heaven and hell.”]

Jablonska, E. and Lamb, M. (2005), Evolution in Four Dimensions, 472 pp. Cambridge Mass.: Bradford Books/MIT Press.[This book importantly argues against a received one-way dogma that evolution is a developmental system in which not only genes but heritable variations play a role in evolution through epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic processes which can modify DNA sequences themselves by selecting which genes switch on and off.]

James, William (1902/1990), The Varieties of Religious Experience, 517 pp. New York : Vintage Books. [This is James’ classic work on religion where his signature concept of pragmatism – the truth is what works’ - is used to assess religious belief: eventually leading to the resonant notion of “a mother sea of consciousness” as a dynamic “finite God”.]

Jonas, Hans (1966), The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology, 303pp. New York: Harper and Row. [This study provides a searching phenomenological account of how scientific mechanism “denies genuineness to the self-experience of life” and of the failure of Heidegger’s philosophy to recover it.]

University Press. [This edition includes all of Kant’s work whose emphasis on the principles of Reason as supreme essentially excludes the felt side of being from any place in epistemology or moral thought.]

Kierkegaard, S. (1978), Kierkegaard’s Writings, (eds. H.V.and E.V.Hong) 24 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [The most comprehensive collection of Kierkegaard’s work, much of it written under pseudonym, including Either–Or, Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments, and Sickness Unto Death which explain his unprecedented exploration of the “infinite inwardness” of human emotional life which he relates to a transcendent and unknowable God.]

Kropotkin, P. (1955), Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution , 362 pp. Boston: Extending Horizons Books. [This is a classical argument for cooperation as a factor of evolution as distinguished from Darwinian competitive struggle alone, providing a wealth of data including of pre-capitalist cooperative social formations but not defining principles.]

Kuhn, T.S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 209 pp. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Definitive analysis of scientific paradigm shifts following persistent anomalies building towards crises in the “normal science” of the day.]

Laing, R.D. (1972), The Politics of the Family. 92pp. Toronto: Anansi-Massey Lectures. [Explains how validating and invalidating attributions within a “family drama” can control and distort the development of human personality by “mapping” of family roles across generations.]

Lane, R.E. (2000), The loss of happiness in market democracies, 465 pp. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [This is a major empirical study showing that rising income and growth negatively correlate with reported happiness after $7500-a-year, demonstrating that the primary assumption by market economics of continuous positive correlation or equation is false.]

Locke, John (1690/1950), The Second Treatise on Government, 139 pp. New York: Liberal Arts Press. [This is the founding classic of liberal value theory arguing for private property by labor right, but negating labor and non-scarcity provisos by the introduction of money.]

Mackie, J.L. (1977), Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 249 pp. New York: Penguin. [Representative text of the dominant view that ethics and moral principles are merely “preferences” and not objective or universalizable.]

Marcuse, H. (1956), Eros and Civilization, 209 pp. Boston: Beacon Press [This is an original philosophical synthesis of Marxian and Freudian thought moving beyond Freud’s reality principle of necessary repression to affirmation of “the life instinct “and unrestricted “libidinous” possibility when society overcomes material scarcity, capitalist repression of labor, and remaining surplus repression.]

Marcuse, H (1964), One-Dimensional Man, 260pp. Boston: Beacon Press [A central text of the 1968 student uprisings in Europe and America, this work this work critiques capitalist technology and its reduction of life to a totalizing consumer-management culture.]


McMurtry, J., (1979) “How to tell the Left from the Right”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy IX (3), 387-411. [This study moves underneath the phenomena of ‘left’ and ‘right’ as primary naming categories of ethico-political opposition to the unexamined principles governing their value-stand meanings since the ancients, and how they provide an explanatory moral compass today.]

McMurtry J. (1986) “The Argumentum Ad Adversarium”, Informal Logic, VIII.1, 27-36. [Explains the underlying logical disorder of fallacies by diversion (ignoratio elenchii) as forms of switching the issue to an accepted enemy or adversary of the community addressed (e.g., “communist”, “liberal”, “unbeliever”), a track-switch of thought argued to be a universal but defeasible form of fallacious thought and social life.]

McMurtry, J. (1988) “The Unforgettable: Understanding the System of Fallacy of the Media”, Informal Logic, 41.3, 133-50. [This analysis sets out the general regulating framework of the “ruling value syntax” as a system of rules selecting against whatever invalidates the presupposed ruling order of control over society’s means of existence, and for whatever validates it - in correspondence to the $< degrees of each.]
McMurtry, J. (1989), *Understanding War*, 90 pp. Toronto: Science for Peace [This monograph demonstrates the locked choice-spaces of the military paradigm of war across cultures and times, and explains the ontological alternative for war value and life support systems.]

McMurtry J (1992), Good Love and Bad Love: A Way of Evaluation, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 6, 326-347 [Applies the primary axiom of value to romantic love spelling out the transformative implications for understanding, emotion and decision.]


Mill, J.S. (1860/1996) *Utilitarianism*, 260pp. New York: Oxford University Press [This volume contains up-to-date commentary on Mill’s classic statement of utilitarianism as “the Greatest Happiness Principle” wherein “all actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce pain”.


Mackie, J.L. (1977), *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, 249 pp. New York: Penguin. [This text is representative of the dominant subjectivist view of Ethics as merely “preferences”: with Mackie arguing that all ethical judgments of right and wrong, good or bad, are “false”.

Mill, J.S. (1860/1996) *Utilitarianism*, 260pp. New York: Oxford University Press [This volume contains the primary modern statement of value as defined by “the Greatest Happiness Principle” wherein “all actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce pain”.


Moore, GE (1909), *Principia Ethica*, 272 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [This is a paradigm work of the close analysis of agent-relative premises which have typified the dominant analytic school of Anglo-American moral theory since David Hume.]


Nietzsche, Friedrich (1964), *The Complete Works of Nietzsche* (ed. O. Levy). New York: Russell and Russell. [Includes the works in value theory referred to and critiqued throughout the 6.25 Theme Essay, such as *The Genealogy of Morals* and, in particular, *Beyond Good and Evil*, a later work which explains Nietzsche’s master idea that “values are constructs of domination”, and that moral will is ultimately a “will to power”.

©Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS)
Philosophy and World Problems—Vol. I: Good and Evil Within: Opening the Terra Incognita of the Felt Side Of Being—John McMurtry

Noddings, Nel (1984/2003), Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, 275pp. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [This work leads in developing a concrete relational morality of caring based on affective response, but is limited to the foreground of external relations with no underlying ontological ground of feeling life itself.]


M.C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen eds. (1993) The Quality of Life. Clarendon: Oxford University Press. This major collection features leaders in the field including the editors in which the value-field of feeling life is typically elided.]

Nussbaum, M. (1999) Sex and Social Justice, 476pp. New York: Oxford University Press. [This work by an outstanding Aristotelian liberal and feminist is revealing its standard attention to “separateness”, “the separate individual” as the “fundamental fact of ethics”.]

G. Outka and J.P. Reeder eds. (1993), Prospectus for a Common Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. This collection of original articles includes internationally recognized leaders in the field such as Alan Gewirth (a definitive account of human rights as generic directives of action entailing the necessary conditions of their fulfillment) and Richard Rorty (antifoundationalist relativization of truth and freedom prioritizing “liberal democracy”). As elsewhere, no common life interests are spelled out as universal life-ground.


Perry, R.B. (1969), Realms of Value: A Critique of Human Civilization, 487 pp. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Perry provides the most comprehensive argument for a general value theory yet published: briefly, the good is what is desired.]


Radhakrishnan, S. and Moore, C. eds. (1957), Storehouse in Indian Philosophy, 683pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [This comprehensive collection of Indian philosophy includes Rg Veda, full texts of the principal Upanishads, the Bhagavad-gita, and substantial selections from Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism, and Aurobindo Ghose.]

Rawls, J. (1967), A Theory of Justice, 542pp. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. [This is the leading work in the field whose paradigmatic method assumes self-maximizing rational choice “including wanting a larger share for oneself” and abstract agents and institutions decoupled from life needs and collective support systems.]


Rorty, R. (1989), Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 289 pp. New York: Cambridge University Press. [This is the most prominent text of the anti-foundationalist movement in philosophy which denies any common standard of truth or value.]


[Rousseau’s best known work features the grounding idea of “giving the law to oneself” to resolve the conflict between individual freedom and state law, with citizens rationally willing “the common interest” to together achieve the “general will” of democratic government.]

Russell, Bertrand (1983-), Bertrand Russell: Collected Papers, 29 vols. London: Allen and Unwin. [Includes Russell’s prolific corpus of philosophical and public works, including his explanations of sense data and logical atomism and neutral monism.]

Ryle, G. (1976) The concept of mind, 334pp. London: Hutchinson. [This influential reductionist argument by Oxford analytic philosopher argues against conceiving the mind as a “ghost in the machine” when behavioral dispositions are all that is at work.]

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1972), Critique of Dialectical Reason. 2 Vols. London: Verso Books. [This is Sartre’s major work after his earlier 1953 classic of existential phenomenology, Being and Nothingness, seeking to synthesize individual existential choice with dialectical rationality.]

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1973), Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, 94 pp. London: Methuen [Originally published as Esquisse d’émotions in 1962, this is Sartre’s direct analysis of emotional life in which they are analyzed as agitations.]

Scheler, Max (1973), Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values; a New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, 620pp. Evanston: Northwestern University Press [This definitive work distinctively opposes Platonic and Kantian ethics by arguing that values are unchanging objects of emotions and feelings rather than reason.]

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1818/1957), The World as Will and Representation, 3 vols. London: Routledge. [Schopenhauer depicts cosmic life as a round of blind desire, competitive struggle and suffering which leads reason to “denial of the will to live” for the quietude of pure detachment (the permanent release) or aesthetic experience (the temporary respite, as in music).]

Schweitzer, Albert (1936), “The Ethics of Reverence for Life”, Christendom, 1, 225-39. [This is the most crystalline argument for Schweitzer’s “absolute ethics of will-to-live [which] must reverence every form of life, seeking so far as possible to refrain from destroying any life”].


Singer, Irving (1966 -1987), The Nature of Love, 3 volumes. Chicago: Chicago University Press. [This is the most comprehensive study of theories of love from Plato to Sartre which argues against any unifying principle of value for the idea of “bestowal of value” on the love object.]

Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation: Man’s Inhumanity to Animals (1983). 302 pp. Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Thorsons Press. [This work deploys utilitarian ethics and the pain-reduction principle to argue against the cruel abuse of domestic animals in factory food systems.]

Smith, Adam (1776/1966), An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 2 vols. New York: A.M. Kelley. [Possibly the most influential work in history, the founding work of “the moral science” in which Smith founds the market free doctrine of capitalism.]

Soble, Alan ed. (1997), Sex, Love and Friendship, 646 pp. Amsterdam: Rodopi. [This comprehensive collection from the American Philosophical Association’s Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love includes all most topics in philosophical research including traditionalist, feminist, gay, genetic, sadomasochistic, open-marriage and classical positions.]

Spinoza, Baruch (1985), The Collected Works of Spinoza (ed. E. Curley), vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [This collection Spinoza’s includes Spinoza’s observation that despotism is led by “fear which keeps the people down dressed in the specious garb of religion”].

provides extensive evidence for the sentience of plants.]

Taylor, Charles (1989), *Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity*, 601 pp. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [This is Taylor’s magnum opus which argues for value grounding in historically developed social relations and moral character in opposition to abstract liberal selves maximizing benefits in “a value-neutral moral void.”]


Whitehead, A.N. (1938), *Modes of Thought*, 172 pp. New York: Macmillan [These lectures on “process philosophy” conceive Nature as “alive”, “feeling”, “purposing” and ever “creative” in the energy flows described by physics as opposed to “dead” and “inert” in the Newtonian tradition.]

Wilson E.O. (1984) *Biophilia* (157 pp.) Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. [The eminent entymologist proposes the “biophilia hypothesis” of an innate “affinity with nature ingrained in our genotype” to “explain why humans care for other species unrelated to them”.]

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968), *Philosophical Investigations*. 260 pp. New York: Macmillan. [This work leads a twentieth-century “linguistic turn” of philosophy in which life foundations, the value field of feeling life and the felt bonds of being dissolve into language behaviors.]

Wollheim, R. (1984), *Thread of Life*, 288 pp. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. [A Freudian philosophical critique of the “thread of life” of an individual in which the roots of moral obligation and values respectively are reduced to persecution and depressive anxiety.]


**Biographical Sketch**

**John McMurtry** holds his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Toronto, Canada and his Ph.D from the University of London, England, and has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph for over 25 years and University Professor Emeritus since 2005. He is an elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and his many articles, chapters, books and interviews have been internationally published and translated.