Reproduced from: Sci-Hub | Dell on Maturana: A real foundation for family therapy? Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 24(3S), 455–461 | 10.1037/h0085741

Cite as: Held, B. S., & Pols, E. (1987). Dell on Maturana: A real foundation for family therapy? Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 24(3S), 455–461. doi:10.1037/h0085741

DELL ON MATURANA: A REAL FOUNDATION FOR FAMILY THERAPY? | Held, B. S., & Pols, E. (1987).

BARBARA S. HELD Bowdoin College

EDWARD POLS Bowdoin College

Reprints may be ordered from Barbara S. Held, Dept. of Psychology, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011.

Two recent articles (Dell, 1985; Held & Pols, 1985a) have explored the problems created for the field of family therapy by a failure to use the term “epistemology” correctly – a failure that has produced a confusion between epistemology and ontology. The major problem is the contradiction of insisting, on the one hand, on the epistemological doctrine that there is no independent reality available to the knower and making, on the other hand, (ontological) claims about how the world really is (e.g., that the world operates by way of circular causality). This article examines Dell’s (1985) attempt, by appealing to Maturana’s doctrine of structure determinism, to resolve a version of this contradiction.

 Paul Dell, who is one of those most responsible for the prominence of the term “epistemology”¹ in family therapy literature, has shown himself to be well aware of the confusion that term can gen­erate. In a recent article (Dell, 1985), “Understanding Bateson and Maturana: Toward a Bio­logical Foundation for the Social Sciences,” Dell, who also happens to be largely responsible for introducing Maturana to family therapists, struggles to clear up some of that confusion. He points out, more clearly than he has done in his past writings, that the source of the confusion is the use of the term “epistemology” to discuss both the nature of knowledge – a question that belongs to the field of epistemology in the classical and prevailing meaning of that term, and the nature of the thing known – a question that belongs to the field of metaphysics, or ontology. (We shall in due course have something to say about why that field is known by both of these names.)

Dell is less clear about the logical relation that exists between the particular epistemology (in the classical and prevailing sense) that has dominated the family therapy field and any metaphysics, or ontology, that might be put forward by someone who defended that epistemology. Thus, although he notices a difficulty in the doctrine of Bateson which is generated by that relation (Dell, 1985, p. 10), he is not clear about the precise nature of the difficulty. He supposes that Bateson has failed to supply an unambiguous ontology – which is true enough. But he also supposes that if Bateson had indeed supplied an unambiguous and appro­priate ontology, that ontology would have provided a needed foundation for the epistemology dominant within family therapy. We disagree. The real dif­ficulty, we think, is that the claims made by that dominant epistemology are in logical contradiction with the claims made by any ontology whatso­ever – provided that that ontology is seriously and unambiguously maintained. To put the matter differently: a contradiction arises whenever that dominant epistemology is maintained by anyone who also maintains a metaphysics / ontology in the classical and prevailing sense of those terms. We find that contradiction in Bateson and others whenever a serious ontological claim is made. We find that it also persists in the doctrine Dell attributes to Maturana.

It is the purpose of this article to make clear the precise nature of that contradiction, particularly as it exists within the family therapy field, and thus to show why Dell’s account of structure de­terminism does not resolve that contradiction. We suspect that the contradiction has not become en­tirely clear to those involved in it because they are already subliminally aware of it and so take evasive action whenever it threatens to emerge with explicit clarity. The evasive action consists in making a metaphysical / ontological claim when that is necessary for establishing one part of the philosophical doctrine which is being defended, and then depriving that claim of seriousness whenever it begins to become manifest that per­sistence in the claim will lead to contradiction. In what follows we shall not be concerned with the intricacies of Dell’s criticism of Bateson but shall focus instead upon the doctrine Dell attributes to Maturana.²

Epistemology (Meaning 1) and Epistemology (Meaning 2)

The view we now intend to apply to the claims Dell makes was set forth in a recent article, “The Confusion About Epistemology and ‘Epistemol­ogy’ – and What to Do About It” (Held & Pols, 1985a).³ In that article we distinguished the clas­sical and prevailing meaning of the term “epis­temology” from the incorrect meaning that now exists side by side with it – when it does not totally displace it – in the field of family therapy. The first (the epistemology of our title) we called epistemology (meaning 1) and defined it as the study of the nature of knowledge – what knowl­edge is, as distinct from mere belief or prejudice; what its limitations are, and so on.

There is clearly much disagreement about what constitutes a correct, or at least adequate, epistemology (meaning 1). The most profound dis­agreement, we pointed out, is about whether the knower is capable of attaining a reality that is independent of the knower, or whether the act of knowing makes its own reality. We used this dis­agreement to divide epistemologies (meaning 1) into two opposed classes. Any that inclined to the view that the knower is capable of attaining an independent reality we called an epistemology (meaning 1)-R, where “R” stands for “independent reality attainable.” Any that inclined to the view that the act of knowing makes its own reality we called an epistemology (meaning 1)-NR, where “NR” stands for “no independent reality attainable.” Epistemologies (meaning 1) that dominate in the family therapy field belong to this latter class (e.g., Dell, 1985). For simplicity, we usually say that epistemology (meaning 1)-NR dominates in the family therapy field. Where our meaning is obvious we sometimes shorten this to “the NR doctrine.” In our article (Held & Pols, 1985a), we provided a spectrum which expressed the variety of formulations the NR doctrine has been given within the systems field; the reader is referred to it for a full account.

We now tum to the second and incorrect meaning of the term “epistemology” – the ‘epistemology’ of the title of our earlier article. In that article we called it epistemology (meaning 2). It is concerned with what we know (or think we know) rather than with what knowledge is. Thus, within the family therapy field a characteristic that one ascribes to the thing known has often been called one’s epistemology – in our terminology, one’s epis­temology (meaning 2). The general characteristic which has been of principal interest to the field is that of causality. Some ascribe a linear causality [i.e., linear epistemology (meaning 2)] to what we know. Others ascribe a circular causality [i.e., circular epistemology (meaning 2)], and indeed this ascription has come to be the dominant one in the systems field. The structure determinism in which Dell sees such promise would, despite his protests, be yet another kind of causality. We called epistemology (meaning 2) an incorrect meaning of the term because the question of the characteristics that belong to the thing known has classically belonged to the discipline called meta­physics – or, as it is sometimes called, ontology. In Held & Pols (1985a), we had this to say about that discipline:

We will undertake no thoroughgoing definition of metaphysics here. In its origins the term signifies not that which is beyond the physical, but rather those fundamental issues that are taken up after the study of physics and the other sciences.⁴ Materialism is thus a metaphysical doctrine no less than idealism is, and scientific determinism is a metaphysical doctrine just as surely as a free-will doctrine is. In Greek philosophy, what is now called metaphysics was understood to be the study of what was then called being and is now more usually called (at least in the sciences) the real – the term ontology (a much later term) comes, of course, from the Greek word for being. We shall not be far wrong if we say that nowadays a metaphysical doctrine – that is, an epistemology (meaning 2) – is generally understood to be a doctrine about what is or is not real in some fundamental sense. (p. 511)

Since the two terms “ontology” and “meta­physics” are interchangeable for the purposes of this article, we will occasionally employ both terms, although Dell prefers the former term. In any event, we and Dell have independently reached the conclusion that the term “epistemology” must be confined to its proper use, that is, epistemology (meaning 1), if we are to avoid theoretical con­fusion.

The Contradiction

We must notice one more agreement with Dell (1985) before we part company with him: any epistemology (meaning 1) that one adopts must be in mutual support with whatever metaphysics / ontology one adopts. Dell’s acceptance of this general principle may be inferred from his argument for a related point, namely, that an appropriate ontology is needed to lend support to the epis­temology (meaning 1) he has himself adopted. Here agreement ends. For the epistemology he, together with a considerable part of the family therapy field, adopts is an epistemology (meaning 1)-NR, and it is our claim that if one adopts an epistemology of that kind, a contradiction will arise if one also adopts a metaphysics / ontology – any metaphysics / ontology. The point, that is to say, is a perfectly general one: the contradiction does not arise just because of some peculiar defect in the ontology called structure determinism. Let us formulate the contradiction in this way.

The Contradiction:

It is contradictory to hold both an epistemology (meaning 1)-NR and a metaphysics / ontology, for the latter makes a claim about how things really are independently of the knower’s form­ative (constructive, ordering, “punctuating”) power.

If one embraces the NR position, one insists on the futility of a reality claim; if one embraces any metaphysics / ontology one makes a reality claim. Most readers will agree that there is a prima facie contradiction. And there are certainly none who would argue that a proper “biological foundation for the social sciences,” which of course include family therapy, can harbor such a con­tradiction. If everybody agreed that the contra­diction is real and that it is exemplified in the position Dell attributes to Maturana, our article could end at this point.

Obviously the situation is not quite so simple, for Dell has in effect objected to this very con­tradiction in the work of Bateson. It is true that he uses the term “objectivity” rather than “reality” in discussing the case of Bateson, and that these terms are not interchangeable in philosophy. Nonetheless, Dell sometimes takes them to be interchangeable – for instance, in a passage in which he taxes Bateson with both insisting that objective knowledge is “impossible” and then al­lowing it to exist “out there” as a Ding an sich “that we cannot know.” The passage (Dell, 1985, p. 10) could perhaps be clearer, but it is clear enough to tell us that Dell is aware of the menacing contradiction.

Let us concede, then, that when Dell advances a metaphysics / ontology as a support for his epistemology (meaning 1)-NR, he is aware that an ontology can provide no support if it brings a contradiction with it. The special virtue of this ontology (let us suppose him to think) is that what allows it to give support to the NR doctrine is precisely what allows it to avoid the contradiction. It is a virtue, he appears to think, that no other ontology possesses.

We contend that the metaphysics / ontology of structure determinism has no such virtue, and that it only seems to have because of an ambiguity in its formulation. When the doctrine of structure determinism is needed to support the epistemology (meaning 1)-NR defended by Dell and Maturana, it is taken seriously – that is, it is used to make what may be called indifferently a truth claim or a reality claim. To put the matter in another way, it is put forward as an ontology in the common meaning of that term. When, however, it is per­ceived that this common meaning brings a contradiction with it and thus leaves a contradiction squarely in the middle of the hoped-for “biological foundation” – in effect a crack in the foundation, the reality claim is renounced, the common mean­ing denied, and ontology is suddenly transformed into a quite different thing, namely, “subject-de­pendent ontology.”

The Pickwick Club

There is a classic literary precedent for this apparent maneuver, and although it does not apply perfectly for reasons which will be discussed later, it may help in what follows if we remind the reader of it. In the jocular proceedings of the Pickwick Club, Mr. Pickwick, who is making a speech, addresses Mr. Blotton as a “vain and disappointed man”; Mr. Blotton responds by calling Mr. Pickwick a humbug. Another member protests this mutual incivility, and the chair intervenes and asks Mr. Blotton to “withdraw the expression he had just made use of.” Mr. Blotton refuses to do so, and the chair then asks him whether he had used that expression in its “common sense.” Mr. Blotton replies that he had not; he had used it in its “Pickwickian sense,” for he in fact holds the club’s eponymous founder in the highest esteem. Mr. Pickwick then graciously concedes that his original insult “had been merely intended to bear a Pickwickian construction.” A Pickwickian con­struction, then, is one that is not meant to be taken seriously or literally.

In what follows we shall see that Dell uses the term “ontology” about the doctrine of structure determinism sometimes in the common sense and sometimes in a Pickwickian sense. In the common sense the contradiction leaps out at us, even though Dell does not go so far as to use the word “real,” which plays so important role in our formulation of the contradiction, but relies instead on other expressions that have all the practical effect of a reality claim. In the Pickwickian sense no contradiction appears, for structure determinism is not then urged as an ontology in the common or prevailing meaning of the term. But that is small comfort, for the doctrine of structure determinism offers no support for the truth of the epistemology (meaning 1)-NR when it is put forward in a non­-serious or Pickwickian sense. That is not surprising, because in that case no truth claim is made on behalf of structure determinism itself.

Structure Determinism: Ontology in the Common or in a Pickwickian Sense?

We tum now to the metaphysics / ontology that Dell provides. It is summed up in the doctrine that the world is “structure-determined,” which yields the corollary doctrine that all interactions, including those which result in what we call knowledge, are instances of “structural coupling.” We provide only a brief definition of this ontology here and refer the reader to Dell (1985) for the complete account. Dell defines the doctrine of structure determinism to mean that “the behavior of all composite unities, whether they be living systems or inanimate objects, are fully determined by their structures (i.e., by the components of the unity and by the relations among those compo­nents)” (Dell, 1985, p. 7). Structural coupling is defined as a consequence of structure determinism, and describes “the relationship between a structure­ determined entity and the medium in which it exists” (p. 12). He argues that “structural coupling is synonymous with existence. . . . [since any unity] which is not structurally coupled to the world cannot exist (in that world)” (p. 12).

It will be obvious that in this summary of the doctrine a general truth claim is made for it. The doctrine says something about “all composite uni­ties, whether they be living systems or inanimate objects,” and its corollary, structural coupling, is said to be “synonymous with existence.” We are plainly dealing with ontology in the common sense – the sense in which it purports to say something about the way things are. Recall that the Greek term for reality is a form of the verb “to be”; recall also that “ontology” contains the same root. In fact, Dell has himself defined on­tology as “claims about how the world is” (Dell, 1985, p. 5). Claims of this sort are what make the doctrine worthy of attention; they represent it as having a validity not confined to the personal outlook or predilection of Dell or Maturana.

But Dell is obliged to do more than assure us of the general truth or validity, the general purchase on reality – on what is, of this doctrine. It must also lend support to his epistemology (meaning 1)-NR doctrine, and this support must be at the least consistent with the NR doctrine. Here is how he proposes to do this.

First, the epistemological consequence [of structure deter­minism] is that objective knowledge is impossible. We can receive no objective information about the world. What we can know is always a function of the interaction [i.e., structural coupling] between the operation of our structure-determined bodies and the world “out there.” (Dell, 1985, p. 9)

Both Maturana and Bateson agree on the impossibility of objective information, but with a very important difference. Bateson’s position entails a subject-dependent epistemology, whereas Maturana’s stance involves both a subject-dependent epistemology and a “subject”-dependent or relativistic ontology. . . . Maturana’s structure determinism says nothing about a “real” or objective world. (Dell, 1985, p. 10)

Here we are in effect told that the earlier de­scription of the doctrine, with all the truth / reality claims made for it, was not really intended to be taken in its common sense. It was not, after all, an ontology in the common sense that was being urged upon us, it was a subject-dependent ontology: the word was intended (on this occasion) in its Pickwickian sense. Thus, as Mr. Pickwick and his friends in their little parliament were able to avail themselves of all the desired insult-value of a word like “humbug” and then cancel all offense by saying that the word was intended only in its Pickwickian sense, so Dell wishes to avail himself of all the truth-value, all the reality-value, of the word “ontology” and then cancel the offense by saying (in effect) that it was intended only in its Pickwickian sense. (The Pickwickian sense, in this case, is effectively a nonontological one­ – that is, Dell has withdrawn his earlier reality claim.) The offense, of course, is the contradiction the term “ontology” brings with it when it is used in its common sense in the context of an NR doctrine.

The maneuver is not jocular. Indeed, it is not a maneuver at all, if the term “maneuver” implies something conscious. Dell is serious, and his in­tellectual integrity is beyond reproach. (For these reasons, Dell cannot be considered a member of the Pickwick Club, the members of which were indeed conscious of the double meanings they employed. Dell, on the other hand, clearly intends each distinct meaning seriously and honestly at the time he employs it and in fact appears unaware of his propensity to switch meanings.) In any case, the ‘maneuver’ is a mistake: within a given region of discourse a key term must not be am­biguous.

Let us now try to place it beyond doubt that there is a mistake, and that it consists in an avoid­ance of an impending contradiction by taking a key term in two distinct and opposed senses. (That is, of course, also a contradiction, for the two senses contradict each other; the contradiction has in effect simply been moved from one place, where it is obvious, to a different place. The one who moves it loses sight of it, but the contradiction is still there.) We now assemble, from the Dell article under consideration (Dell, 1985), some quotations in which an ontology of structure determinism is being put forward in the common sense and some quotations in which it is being put forward in a Pickwickian sense. Quotations from Dell (1985) are identified only by page number. These identifications appear in square brackets, to distinguish them from references to Maturana that are internal to the Dell quotations. Occasional comments of our own also appear in square brackets.

Ontology in the Common Sense

Maturana’s concept of structure determinism is an explicit ontological claim. [Abstract]

Every biological entity both has and is a way of knowing: “living, as a process, is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system” (Maturana, 1970, p. 8). [p. 5] [Note especially the insistence on validity in the last sentence and thus on the generality of the claim.]

Interactions do not specify how the system will behave; the system specifies how it will behave. More accurately, the structure of the system specifies how it will behave. [p. 6] [Note that this implies that one view of causality is incorrect, the other correct.]

Without this determinism, science could not proceed (and we and the universe which we know could not exist). . . . Without some kind of ontological determinism, all would be chaos and everything would behave without rhyme or reason. [p. 7] [To make structure determinism basic to science is immediately to take it out of the realm of the “uniquely legitimate” – i.e., uniquely legitimate to Maturana.]

Maturana’s ontological claim is that the world is structure­ determined (Maturana, 1975, 1978). . . . The behavior of a living system in its medium is a specific case of the gen­eral – that we live in a world of structure-determined entities! [p. 7] [Note the emphasis on the generality of the reality claim.]

With this single bold insight (i.e., structure determinism), Maturana has retrieved the grand mechanistic universe that was envisioned by Newton – but with a difference. [p. 7] [Note the phrase “bold insight”; it implies that Maturana has achieved something that is more than just an instance of his unique structural coupling.]

All interaction involves structure-determined couplings between objects. If we are able to couple ourselves to objects in such a way that we can bring about a predicted or desired outcome, then we will have the psychological experience of [linear or “instructive”] causality.[p. 9] [Dell is saying that we sometimes falsely conclude that linear causality is operative, and reference to the true doctrine of structure determinism makes it clear to us why we find ourselves committing that error. It should, incidentally, be noticed that structure determinism is not an ontology that somehow dispenses with the notion of causality; it simply provides a slightly different version of causality, which it claims to be the correct one.]

Because such causality [i.e., linear, or “instructive”] is im­possible, control is impossible too. Systems may be coupled to one another (e.g., the mother who uses effective child­ rearing techniques), but control (in the sense of instructive interaction) is ontologically impossible. [p. 11, italics added] [Once again an incorrect, or “impossible” ontology, which includes a certain version of causality, is being contrasted with the true one, which includes a different version of cau­sality.]

We have so far confined ourselves to Dell’s 1985 article, but before turning to ontology in a Pickwickian sense, we might note that Dell has used the term “ontology” in the common sense in earlier writings about Maturana. In Dell (1982a), for instance, he said, “Maturana may have dis­covered the correct ontology” (pp. 60-61, italics added), and further argued, “Systems are circu­lar. . . . Thus, although families and other systems can be described as having a hierarchical orga­nization, we must remember that that is not the way that systems actually [italics added] operate” (p.63).

Ontology in a Pickwickian Sense

The epistemological consequence [of Maturana’s ontological claim that we live in a structure-determined world] is that objective knowledge is impossible. We can receive no objective information about the world. What we can know is always a function of the interaction between the operation of our structure­-determined bodies and the world “out there”:

Knowledge implies interactions, and we cannot step out of our domain of interactions, which is closed. We live, there­fore, in a domain of subject-dependent knowledge and sub­ject-dependent reality. . . . In fact, any knowledge of a transcendental absolute reality is intrinsically impossible. (Maturana, 1978, p.60)

[pp.9-10] [Note that this quotation, with its internal quotation from Maturana, begins with a claim that is ontological in the common sense and then switches to the Pickwickian sense, which is, in effect, indistinguishable from epistemology (meaning 1)-NR.]

Maturana’s stance involves both a subject-dependent episte­mology and a “subject”-dependent or relativistic ontology. . . . Maturana’s structure determinism says nothing about a “real” or objective world.[p. 10 ]

What is important to understand here is that perception is not and can never be objective-and yet, all observations have equal validity, even the pink elephants seen by the hallucinating alcoholic. The classical Freudian may distinguish an oedipal complex when (a) a Kleinian would distinguish projective identification, (b) a structural family therapist would distinguish diffuse boundaries, (c) a strategic therapist would see more of the same solution being applied, and (d) the drunk would see still more pink elephants. None of these observations are objective, but all of them are valid in that they are specified by the structure of the observer in conjunction with what that observer’s interaction with the medium allows. For these rea­sons, Maturana insists that all realities which we bring forth are legitimate. [p.16, italics added] [The reader will notice that the general relativistic claim made here applies to structure determinism as well. Of course, the justification for the relativism given in the next to the last sentence is simply an appeal to the nonrelativistic truth of structure determinism. So in this one quotation we have structure determinism urged on us as an ontology in both a common and a Pickwickian sense.]

Like all other distinctions, those of Maturana are uniquely legitimate but have no claim to the status of being objectively truthful. [p.17] [It seems fair to say that “uniquely legitimate” means no more than “true for Maturana only.”]

Conclusions

We are left with the unavoidable conclusion that, despite earnest attempts to escape contra­diction, Dell remains trapped in the very logical contradiction he accuses Bateson of propounding. If, as Dell (1985) suggests, “all observations have equal validity” since “perception is not and never can be objective” (p.16), then on what ontological basis (in the common sense) can he maintain that Maturana’s structure-determined view of the uni­verse is “an enormously comprehensive and pow­erful set of distinctions” (p.17)?

In fact, it seems to us that Dell’s most serious contradiction lies in his attempt to persuade us of the value (or validity) of Maturana’s personal distinctions. Maturana himself has argued that an implication of his structure-determined and thus nonobjective view of the world is that “you lose the passion for changing the other. One of the results is that you look apathetic to people. Now, those who do not live with objectivity in parentheses have a passion for changing the other. So they have this passion and you do not” (Simon, 1985, p.43). It is not surprising that Dell’s writing is impassioned, and we may perhaps take this as a clue to his true feelings about the reality claim of his ontological position. Speed (1984), in a critique of Watzlawick’s How Real Is Real?, argued that despite the ‘rhetoric’ of subjectivity (i.e., pro­pounding an epistemology (meaning 1)-NR), sys­temic therapists operate as if some hypotheses are more accurate or adequate then others.

The question then becomes – is it more useful, in terms of providing a guide to action, to believe that reality exists and that we can know it more or less adequately or to believe that all is invention? Although we can enjoy taking either position at the level of abstract philosophical debate, I would suggest that on a practical, day-by-day level, my position is more useful and, what is more, that even the constructivists operate practically as if reality exists and that we can know it more or less adequately. (Speed, 1984, p.520)

While Dell might counter that “Maturana’s structure determinism says nothing about a ‘real’ or objective world” (Dell, 1985, p. 10), Dell’s actions and pragmatic position imply that he be­lieves otherwise. But in any case, we must remain clear about one point if we are to avoid contra­diction: if we continue to adopt an extreme or radical epistemological (meaning 1)-NR doctrine, we cannot then argue one way or the other the merits of any ontology.

References

1. DELL, P. F. (1982a). Family theory and the epistemology of Humberto Maturana. In F. W. Kaslow (Ed.), The Inter­ national Book of Family Therapy (pp. 56-66). New York: Brunner/Mazel.
2. DELL, P. F. (1982b). Beyond homeostasis: Toward a concept of coherence. Family Process, 21, 21-41.
3. DELL, P. F. (1985). Understanding Bateson and Maturana: Toward a biological foundation for the social sciences. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 11, 1-20.
4. HELD, B. S. & POLS, E. (1985a). The confusion about epis­temology and “epistemology” – and what to do about it. Family Process, 24, 509-517.
5. HELD, B. S. & POLS, E. (1985b). Rejoinder: On contradiction. Family Process, 24, 521-524.
6. HELD, B. S. (1986). The relationship between individual psy­chologies and strategic / systemic therapies reconsidered. In E. Efron (Ed.), Journeys: Expansion of the Strategic-Systemic Therapies (pp. 222-260). New York: Brunner/ Mazel.
7. MATURANA, H. R. (1975). The organization of the living: A theory of the living organization. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 1, 313-332.
8. MATURANA, H. R. (1978). Biology of language: The epistemology of reality. In G. A. Miller and E. Lenneberg (Eds.), Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought (pp. 27-63). New York: Academic Press.
9. MATURANA, H. R. (1980). Biology of cognition. In H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela (Eds.), Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (pp. 5-58). Boston: D. Reidel. (Original work published in 1970.)
10. SIMON, R. (1985). Structure is destiny: An interview with Humberto Maturana. The Family Therapy Networker, 9 (3), 32-37; 41-43.
11. SPEED, B. (1984). Rejoinder: Mountainous seas are also wet. Family Process, 23, 518-520.

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Reproduced from: Sci-Hub | Maturana’s constitutive ontology of the observer. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 24(3S), 462–466 | 10.1037/h0085742

Cite as: Dell, P. F. (1987). Maturana’s constitutive ontology of the observer. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 24(3S), 462–466. doi:10.1037/h0085742

MATURANA’S CONSTITUTIVE ONTOLOGY OF THE OBSERVER | Dell, P. F. (1987).

PAUL F. DELL

Eastern Virginia Medical School

Reprints may be ordered from Paul F. Dell, Eastern Virginia Medical School, Dept. of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Eastern VA Family Therapy Inst., 205 Business Park Drive, Virginia Beach, VA 23462.

Maturana makes no metaphysical claims about the nature of a hypothetical independent reality. His biology of cognition explains the constitutive ontology of the observer. This ontology of the observer directly implies that the cognitive domain of human observers is structure­-determined and, therefore, that humans distinguish a structure-determined world.

In a well-documented and cogently argued cri­tique, Held & Pols (1987) have contended that my recent essay on Gregory Bateson and Humberto Maturana (Dell, 1985) contains a fatal con­tradiction. Specifically, they note that I, like many family therapists, advocate an epistemology which holds that “the act of knowing makes its own reality” (Held & Pols, 1987, p. 456). Held & Pols contend that if one adopts such an episte­mology, then one “cannot . . . argue one way or the other the merits of any ontology” (p. 460).

Held & Pols are concerned with the traditional notion of metaphysics. My essay (Dell, 1985) has led them to believe that I (and Maturana) are similarly concerned with metaphysics. We are not. Were we, in fact, speaking of a metaphysical independent reality, then Held & Pols’s highly articulate critique would be devastatingly correct. Still, their commentary makes it painfully apparent that my use of the term “ontology” appears to refer to a metaphysical or transcendental reality and, thereby, has rendered my article vulnerable to criticism. Accordingly, I shall restate and elab­orate certain matters in hopes of conveying to the reader that the validity of Held & Pols’s critique lies in my perhaps ill-advised use of the term “ontology,” rather than in the theory of Maturana.⁵

Held & Pols have clearly summarized the tra­ditional understanding of metaphysics: “a meta­ physics / ontology . . . makes a claim about how things really are independently of the knower’s formative (constructive, ordering, ‘punctuating’) power” (p. 457). Maturana, however, has re­peatedly and explicitly stated that his biology of cognition can never speak of, nor have access to, such an independent reality:

Knowledge implies interactions, and we cannot step out of our domain of interactions which is closed. We live, therefore, in a domain of subject-dependent reality. . . . In fact, any knowledge of a transcendental absolute reality is intrinsically impossible; if a supposed transcendental reality were to become accessible to description then it would not be transcendental because a description always implies interactions and, hence, reveals only a subject-dependent reality. (Maturana, 1978, p. 60)

In Maturana’s view, we are inescapably bound to our biological and linguistic functioning. Ac­cordingly, we can say nothing about a putative metaphysical reality.

The Constitutive Ontology of the Observer

Maturana has no interest in an independent metaphysical reality. Nevertheless, he is vitally concerned with ontology.⁶ Specifically, Maturana seeks to analyze the constitutive ontology of the observer and, then, to specify the implications of that constitutive ontology for the nature of the existence of everything that we distinguish as ob­servers. What is an observer? An observer is the essential and inescapable constitutive condition of human beings: “An observer is, in general, any being operating in language, or in particular, any human being in the understanding that language defines humanity” (Maturana, 1986).

So, we operate within language. What are the implications of this constitutive condition of the observer for the existence of all things? First, the observer is the necessary constitutive condition for the existence of anything⁷:

Without observers nothing can be said, nothing can be explained, nothing can be claimed . . . in fact, without observers nothing exists because existence is specified in the operation of dis­tinction of the observer. (Maturana, 1986)

Second, any attempt to study the world must take seriously the constitutive limitations of ourselves as observers:

In our individual experience as human beings we find ourselves in language; we do not see ourselves growing into it: we are already observers by being in language when we begin as observers to reflect upon language and the condition of being observers. In other words, whatever takes place in the praxis of living of the observer takes place as distinctions in language through languaging, and this is all he or she can do as such. (Maturana, 1986)

Third, the observer and its phenomena must become the object of fundamental investigation:

Any reflection or comment about how the praxis of living comes about is an explanation, a reformulation of what takes place. If this reformulation does not question the properties of the observer, if it takes for granted cognition and language, then it must assume the independent existence of what is known. If this reformulation questions the properties of the observer, if it asks about how cognition and language arise, then it must accept the experiential indistinguishability between illusion, hallucination and perception, and take as constitutive that existence is dependent on the biology of the observer. (Maturana, 1986)

Fourth, all explanation is subject to these con­stitutive limitations. As such, all explanations occur within language and within our phenomenal domain as biological entities. That is, everything that we distinguish, and everything that we say (i.e., explanations) about the things that we have distin­guished, occur within the ‘experiential situation in which everything that is, everything that hap­pens, is and happens in us as part of our praxis of living” (Maturana, 1986). We may explain our experience in terms of matter, energy, structure determinism, spirit, God, or whatever. Nevertheless, these explanations are, and can only be, just another part of our praxis of living – not how things really are independently of the observer. For these reasons, Maturana refutes the frequent assumption that science reveals an objective (i.e., independent or transcendental) reality. In his view, the assumption of an objective reality is unnecessary because that is not what science explains. Instead, science explains the phenomena which occur in the praxis of living of the observer:

Scientific explanations do not require the assumption of ob­jectivity [i.e., objective, transcendental reality] because scientific explanations do not explain an independent objective reality. Scientific explanations explain the praxis of living of the observer, and they do so with the operational coherences brought forth by the observer in his or her praxis of living. It is this fact that gives science its biological foundations and that makes science a cognitive domain bound to the biology of the observer with characteristics that are determined by the ontology of observing. (Maturana, 1986; italics added)

Maturana is unequivocally clear that “science, as the domain of scientific statements, does not need an objective independent reality nor does it reveal one” (Maturana, 1986).

At this point, we are approaching the aspect of Maturana’s thought that led me to speak so often of “ontology” in a way that Held & Pols were, I think, inevitably bound to find problematic. That is, I can hardly object when Held & Pols believe that some of my phrasings [e.g., “Maturana’s ontological claim is that the world is structure­ determined” (Dell, 1985, p. 7)] refer to a meta­physical reality that exists “independently of the knower’s . . . formative power.” Now, I must explain why my words do not refer to the meta­physical reality that they so unambiguously seem to invoke.

The Ontological Status of Structure Determinism

Maturana says that observers distinguish two kinds of unities, simple and composite. A simple unity is a unity that is constituted and brought forth in an operation of distinction such that the unity is “exclusively and completely characterized by the properties through which it is brought forth in the praxis of living of the observer that distin­guishes it, and no further explanation is needed for the origin of these” (Maturana, 1986). A com­posite unity, on the other hand, is “a unity dis­tinguished as a simple unity that through further operations of composition is decomposed by the observer into components that, through their com­position, would constitute the original simple unity in the domain in which it is distinguished” (Ma­turana, 1986). Said briefly, simple unities are those that we distinguish solely in terms of properties, and composite unities are those simple unities that we have further analyzed (“through further op­erations of distinction”) in order to determine the components and relations that generate the prop­erties which allowed us to distinguish it as a simple unity in the first place.

So, what is structure determinism? The structure of a composite unity is comprised of two things: the components of the composite unity and the relations among them. Structure determinism is Maturana’s term for the mechanistic functioning of composite unities:

Since the structure of a composite unity consists in its com­ ponents and their relations, any change in a composite unity consists in a structural change, and arises in it at every instant necessarily determined by its structure at that instant through the operation of the properties of its components. (Maturana, 1986)

Thus, a structure-determined system is one whose every change is determined by its structure. Which systems are structure-determined? Those which science explains:

Since mechanistic systems are structure-determined systems, and since scientific explanations entail the proposition of mechanistic systems as the systems that generate the phenomena to be explained, in scientific explanations we deal, and we can only deal, with structure-determined systems. (Maturana, 1986)

And what does science explain? Science explains composite, structure-determined unities so as to make understandable the properties of simple uni­ties. In other words, Maturana is saying that a) the distinguishing of composite unities and b) the project of science are fundamentally the same. Namely, both involve the delineation of structure­-determined systems that explain the properties of the myriad kinds of simple unities that we distin­guish (e.g., stars, humans, cars, ideologies, en­meshed families, male chauvinists, etc.).

Maturana is unswerving in his insistence that, because we are bound to our own cognitive and linguistic functioning, we can never claim that the things which we distinguish have an inde­pendent, objective existence. He calls this view “putting objectivity in parentheses.” In keeping with this outlook, Maturana states that neither simple nor composite unities exist independently of us (as observers); the distinction of these unities is founded upon the constitutive ontology of the observer:

By putting objectivity in parentheses we accept that consti­tutively we cannot claim the independent existence of things (entities, unities, ideas, etc.), and we recognize that a unity exists only in its distinction in the praxis of living of the observer that brings it forth. But we also recognize that the distinction takes place in the praxis of the observer in an operation that specifies simultaneously [1] the class identity [e.g., star, human, enmeshed family, etc.] of the unity dis­tinguished, either as a simple unity or as a composite one, and [2] its domain of existence as the domain of the operational coherences in which its distinction makes sense also as a feature of his or her praxis of living. (Maturana, 1986; italics added)

What Maturana is saying here is that each and every distinction is a) constitutively bound to the praxis of living of the observer and b) has its own complementary domain of existence. What is a domain of existence? It is the domain of operational validity of the properties that define the unity and allow it to be distinguished (i.e., to exist) as that kind of unity:

The operation of distinction that brings forth and specifies a unity, also brings forth and specifies its domain of existence as the domain of the operational coherences entailed by the operation of the properties through which the unity is char­acterized in its distinction. (Maturana, 1986)

Now, we come to the crucial point regarding the epistemological and ontological status of structure determinism. Maturana’s concept of domains of existence is inseparable from his thinking about structure determinism. Why? Because the relation between a unity and its domain of existence is a deterministic one:

An operation of distinction that brings forth a simple unity brings forth its domain of existence as the domain of operational applicability of its properties, and constitutes the simple unity and its domain of existence as a deterministic system. (Maturana, 1986; italics added)

Here, the scope of Maturana’s views regarding structure determinism is finally apparent. Structure determinism is applicable to more than just science and composite unities; it is applicable to every unity that is distinguished by an observer!

The distinction of a unity entails its domain of existence as a composite unity that includes it as a component. Therefore, there are as many domains of existence as kinds of unities an observer may bring forth in his or her operations of distinction. In these circumstances, since the notion of determinism applies to the operation of the properties of the components of a unity in its composition . . . all domains of existence, as composite entities that include the unities that specify them, conform deterministic systems. (Maturana, 1986; italics added)

In light of this, the reader may be able to see the following: 1) why I asserted, perhaps in a philosophically misleading way, that “Maturana’s on­tological claim is that the world is structure-determined” (Dell, 1985, p. 7); 2) why Held & Pols believed that such statements must pertain to a metaphysical, independent reality; and 3) why Maturana claims that he is only speaking of a “subject-dependent reality” (Maturana, 1978, p. 60).

When Maturana says that “all domains of ex­istence . . . conform deterministic systems,” he is not making a traditional metaphysical “claim about how things really are independently of the knower’s formative (constructive, ordering, punctuating) power” (Held & Pols, 1987, p. 457). Rather, Maturana is saying that the cognitive do­main of humans is a deterministic one. He has provided an explanation of cognition which necessarily implies that, for us as observers, living systems are structure determined.

The only systems that we can explain scientifically are structure­ determined systems, therefore, if I provide a scientific expla­nation of the phenomenon of cognition in living systems, I provide a proof that living systems are structure-determined systems in our praxis of living as standard observers, which is where we distinguish them. (Maturana, 1986)

In other words, Maturana is saying that the entire domain of human distinctions (i.e., all that we distinguish) is a “cognitive domain bound to the biology of the observer with characteristics that are determined by the ontology of observing” (Maturana, 1986). Thus, we distinguish structure­ determined systems everywhere because that is the nature of the cognitive domain of human ob­servers. So, in that sense, the world that we distinguish and live in as human observers is a structure-determined one. With regard to the question of whether this constitutes a traditional meta­physical doctrine, I defer to the professional philosophers such as Pols. Certainly, structure de­terminism pertains to “the nature of the thing known – a question that belongs to the field of metaphysics, or ontology” (Held & Pols, 1987, p. 455). On the other hand, however, structure determinism does not refer to “how things really are independently of the knower’s formative . . . power” (Held & Pols, 1987, p. 457), so, maybe structure determinism is not a traditional meta­physical doctrine.

Finally, it may be helpful to conclude this dis­cussion by quoting Maturana’s most definitive statement about that reality which he calls “tran­scendental” and which Held & Pols (1987) call “metaphysics / ontology in the classical and pre­vailing sense of those terms” (p. 455):

For epistemological reasons we ask for a substratum that could provide an independent ultimate justification or validation of distinguishability, but . . . such a substratum remains beyond our reach as observers. All that we can say ontologically about the substratum . . . is that it permits what it permits, and that it permits all the operational coherences that we bring forth in the happening of living as we exist in language. (Maturana, 1986)

References

1. DELL, P. F. (1985). Understanding Bateson and Maturana: Toward a biological foundation for the social sciences. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 11, 1-20.
2. HELD, B. S. & POLS, E. (1987). Dell on Maturana: A real foundation for family therapy? Psychotherapy, 24, 455-461.
3. MATURANA, H. R. (1970). Neurophysiology of cognition. In Garvin (Ed.), Cognition: A Multiple View (pp. 3-22). New York: Spartan.
4. MATURANA, H. R. (1974). Cognitive strategies. In R. Abram­ovitz et al. (Eds.), Cybernetics of Cybernetics (pp. 457- 469). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
5. MATURANA, H. R. (1975). The organization of the living. A theory of the living organization. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 1, 313-332.
6. MATURANA, H. R. (1978). Biology of language: The epis­temology of reality. In G. A. Miller and E. Lenneberg (Eds.), Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought (pp. 27-63). New York: Academic Press.
7. MATURANA, H. R. (1970/1980). Biology of cognition. In R. Maturana and F. J. Varela (Eds.), Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (pp. 5-58). Boston: D. Reidel.
8. MATURANA, H. R. (1986). The biological foundations of self­-consciousness and the physical domains of existence (un­published manuscript).
9. MATURANA, H. R. & GUILOFF, G. D. (1980). The quest for the intelligence of intelligence. Journal of Social and Bi­ological Structures, 3, 135-148.

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Reproduced from: Sci-Hub | The philosophy of Dell and Maturana. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 24(3S), 466–468 | 10.1037/h0085743

Cite as: Held, B. S., & Pols, E. (1987). The philosophy of Dell and Maturana. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 24(3S), 466–468. doi:10.1037/h0085743

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DELL AND MATURANA | Held, B. S., & Pols, E. (1987).

BARBARA S. HELD
EDWARD POLS
Bowdoin College

Reprints may be ordered from Barbara S. Held, Department of Psychology, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011.

Our response to Dell’s 1985 article (Held & Pols, 1987) was prompted by the first author’s concern, as a member of the family therapy field, about the consequences for that field of the views about knowledge and reality expressed by such writers as Bateson, Dell, and Maturana, among others. She perceived that although the article was written by a knowledgeable family therapist who was one of the first to demonstrate that he under­stood the consequences of the misuse of the term “epistemology” in the family therapy literature­ for instance, by pointing out in that article the contradiction in Bateson’s views – Dell had in the course of the article himself succumbed to that same contradiction. The contradiction itself can be expressed in terms that any family therapist who is unused to the terminology employed by Bateson, Dell, and Maturana – and by ourselves in an earlier article – can readily understand. The contradiction consists in making, on the one hand, reality claims about (in this case) the nature of human cognition / observation – perfectly general claims about how human cognition / observation functions, no matter where or how it is exer­cised – and, on the other hand, insisting that this function is such that it can never in principle do anything but create its own ‘reality’. We have labored this point sufficiently in our article itself, and here it need only be said that Dell’s reply simply reiterates the contradiction despite his avoidance of the term “ontology” in the sense that made the contradiction leap out at the reader in his 1985 article.

Dell in his reply concedes that Maturana’s pub­lished work as interpreted in Dell (1985) is open to this charge of being self-contradictory. The fault, he generously maintains, is his own, and not Maturana’s. Properly understood, Dell says, Maturana makes no reality claims, and therefore he advances no ontology in the sense of a reality claim, that is, advances no metaphysics / ontology. In support of this argument Dell (1987) offers, in his first three paragraphs, some few remarks of his own and Maturana’s in which reality is explicitly characterized as subject dependent, and in which he fails to notice that that part of Maturana’s own doctrine which seizes upon our “biological and linguistic functioning” (p. 4) to account for this alleged subject dependency is implicitly exempted from this subject dependency. In short, Dell, pro­testing that he and Maturana are not explicitly interested in propounding a reality claim (i.e., a metaphysics), has failed to notice that lack of an explicit interest is not sufficient to prevent one from making a reality claim. Our point is by no means only a terminological one of the kind that might interest only professional philosophers: the contradiction would have been present in Dell’s 1985 article even if he had not used the term “ontology” in the course of it, for one need not incorporate the term “ontology” itself to make a reality claim. And we do indeed find the contra­diction present in his reply despite the fact that he now avoids – and even repudiates – one of then the 1985 article (i.e., the common meaning) and confines himself to the somewhat different sense conveyed by the expression “constitutive ontology.”⁸

Dell goes on to develop his exculpation of Ma­turana in more detail by means of extensive quo­tation from and paraphrase of an unpublished manuscript of Maturana’s, which he identifies in the text as “Maturana (1986).” It is impossible for either ourselves or the readers of this journal to assess that manuscript with complete objectivity until its publication. But perhaps the meaning of a manuscript as something stable that a group of readers can focus on with objectivity (i.e., in common) is not the issue. The unpublished man­uscript itself calls upon us, after all, to “accept the experiential indistinguishability between il­lusion, hallucination and perception, and take as constitutive that existence is dependent on the biology of the observer” (Maturana, 1986, cited in Dell, 1987, p. 463). Yet, supposing (as we think the readers of this journal will also suppose) that the manuscript does have an objective meaning that can be partially assessed even in the incomplete version provided by Dell’s reply, we conclude that Dell, in his 1985 article, was more faithful than he thinks to Maturana’s doctrine.

There is, on the evidence of the unpublished manuscript, a clear commitment on Maturana’s part to phenomenology and to the views of what the second author has recently called the linguistic consensus (Pols, 1986). But the contradiction is by no means avoided by this commitment. We had never supposed that Maturana was what phi­losophers call a naive scientific realist – that he assumed, at the explicit level, that science reveals an objective reality that is deterministic. He is, rather, claiming that as observers and knowers we must see the world as structurally determined. In effect, then, he simply relocates in the biology of the observer the determinism a naive scientific realist might place ‘out there’ in the external world: the biology of the observer so constitutes (i.e., gives structure to) the thing observed that the latter shall be deterministic. But in doing so, Ma­turana implicitly takes it for granted that he can really know our biological natures and that they really have this constitutive power: “Maturana is saying that the entire domain of human distinctions (i.e., all that we distinguish) is a ‘cognitive domain bound to the biology of the observer with char­acteristics that are determined by the ontology of observing’ (Maturana, 1986). Thus, we distinguish structure-determined systems everywhere because that is the nature of the cognitive domain of hu­man observers” (Dell, 1987, p. 465). More simply put, Maturana’s own doctrine is exempted from the relativistic strictures it lays down for the rest of us.

Of course, Maturana is making a reality claim­ – a general claim about the nature of the observer or knower; and that is what generates the contra­diction, for he also claims that each cognitive act produces its own subject-dependent reality. Mak­ing a reality claim, Maturana’s doctrine is a “traditional metaphysical doctrine” (Dell, 1987, p. 465); denying the possibility of reality claims, it is of course not a traditional metaphysical doctrine. Insisting on doing both is contradictory, and in the present case this produces a terminological contradiction as well.

Dell (1987, p. 465) tries to reduce the point we have just made to a mere terminological one that can be left to professional philosophers. It does not matter, perhaps, what terminology one uses to make the point we have made in the pre­ceding paragraph. It does matter, however, that there is a contradiction. And it is not the least surprising that the real contradiction should also generate the terminological one. It matters also that in making that point one is doing philosophy. It is important to observe, incidentally, that Maturana is not operating as a biologist in his 1986 manuscript, no more than Dell is operating as a family therapist in his 1985 article and in his reply to us: both are operating as philosophers. Not all philosophers are professional ones.⁹ What we have been saying is that, as philosophers, Dell and Maturana have not been able to operate without making reality claims they have failed to notice. Hence the contradiction.

References

1. DELL, P. F. (1985). Understanding Bateson and Maturana: Toward a biological foundation for the social sciences. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 11, 1-20.
2. DELL, P. F. (1987). Maturana’s constitutive ontology of the observer. Psychotherapy, 24, 462-465.
3. HELD, B. S. & POLS, E. (1987). Dell on Maturana: A real foundation for family therapy? Psychotherapy, 24, 455- 461.
4. MATURANA, H. R. (1986). The biological foundations of self­-consciousness and the physical domains of existence (unpublished manuscript).
5. POLS, E. (1986). After the linguistic consensus: The real foun­dation question. Review of Metaphysics, 40, 17-40.

1. In this article double quotation marks are employed when a word is mentioned rather than used; single quotation marks are employed when a word is used in an unusual sense.

2. We assume that he reports Maturana’s views accurately, but we concern ourselves only with Maturana’s doctrine as it appears in Dell’s writings (especially Dell, 1985). This is in part because Maturana has become known to family therapists primarily by way of Dell’s writings (e.g., Dell, 1982a,b, 1985). All quotations of Maturana are thus taken directly from Dell (1985) and are so referenced.

3. The matter is discussed further in a chapter by Held (1986).

4. The name “metaphysics” was first applied to a treatise of Aristotle’s some 275 years after his death. The Alexandrian editors who applied that name were merely referring to the arrangement of his various treatises: the papyrus rolls about what Aristotle himself called first philosophy were arranged after (“meta”) the rolls about what Aristotle called physics (Held & Pols, 1985b, p. 522).

5. It is at least awkward, if not risky, to defend simultaneously a) the ideas of Maturana and b) the wording of my previous portrayal of those ideas. I believe that Held & Pols are primarily interested in the philosophical adequacy of Maturana’s ideas rather than my perhaps less than adequate rendition of those ideas. In keeping with this belief, I will stipulate that Held & Pols’s critique constitutes prima facie evidence that my earlier essay clearly lends itself to being understood to contain a philosophical contradiction. Rather than laboriously defend the wording of my earlier essay, I will now describe Maturana’s constitutive ontology in order to show that the philosophical contradiction, with which Held & Pols have concerned them­selves, is not, in fact, present. To that end, I shall, as much as possible, let Maturana speak for himself by quoting extensively (with his permission) from his most recent and com­prehensive account of his ideas (Maturana, 1986). I refer the reader to that manuscript and to Maturana’s other major articles (Maturana, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1970/1980; Maturana & Guiloff, 1980).

6. The present article addresses itself narrowly to Maturana’s constitutive ontology of the observer and to the ontological status of structure determinism. This narrow scope is necessitated by the task of responding to the specific philosophical critique of Held & Pols. Despite the legitimacy of this task, the author is well aware that the topic and scope of this article is a bit odd for this journal. Maturana’s theory is, in fact, strikingly broad both in its explanatory power and in its implications. The author encourages readers to acquaint themselves with Maturana’s extremely original articles.

7. This contention of Maturana would seem to suggest that his thinking has much in common with the epistemological view of Husserl and today’s cognitive psychologists. The philosophically sophisticated reader is cautioned that Maturana’s epistemological thought can only be understood adequately in light of matters which exceed the scope of this article­ – namely, his explanation of the constitutively interpersonal nature of language and the observer: Maturana claims that language and self-consciousness are biological phenomena which do not reside in the brain or in the subject, but rather in the social domain (i.e., in the recursive structural coupling among men and women that constitutes them as observers) (Maturana, 1978, 1986).

8. Because this technical term, which may be unfamiliar to many readers, forms part of Dell’s title, it is worth a termi­nological digression. Although the expression “constitutive ontology of the observer” dominates Dell’s reply, we do not find that expression in any of the many quotations Dell offers us from Maturana’s unpublished 1986 manuscript. We find in the Maturana quotations only the expression “ontology of observing,” which, though vague and unusual, may possibly mean the same thing (cited in Dell, 1987, pp. 463, 465). Nevertheless, the places in which Maturana (1986) does use some form of the word “constitutive” (cited in Dell, 1987, pp. 463, 464, 465) make it clear enough that that Kantian term is important for him – as it is, in fact, for most phe­nomenologists. Unfortunately, neither Maturana (at least in the passages vouchsafed to us) nor Dell (in his comment on these) is quite clear about just what that technical term means. An overstatement may help make it as clear as it can be made in a footnote: for Kant the active power of the subject constitutes the form or structure of the object – that is, the subject brings objectivity into being by giving the latter its formal constitution. Otherwise expressed, objectivity is subjective in origin. From this terminological perspective, we may infer that for Dell and Maturana “constitutive ontology of the observer” is equivalent to “subject-dependent ontology” and “subject-dependent reality.” So Dell, though he has given us more detail, has not given us more than what we have already recognized in the article he replies to. We had, after all, amply noticed that Maturana argues explicitly for a subject-dependent ontology / reality.

9. Both the first and the second author are inclined – for different reasons – to think that that is a good thing.